Cross-border Access to Electronic Data through Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters. State of the art and latest developments in the EU and the US. CEPS Liberty and Security in Europe Papers No. 2018-07, November 2018 by Stefan, Marco & Fuster, Gloria González
 This paper has been prepared in the context of the JUD-IT (Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters and 
Electronic IT Data in the EU: Ensuring Efficient Cross-Border Cooperation and Mutual Trust) Project, with 
financial support from the Justice Programme of the European Union (JUST-AG-2016-01). The opinions 
expressed in this report are attributable solely to the authors in a personal capacity and not to any institution 
with which they are associated, nor can they be taken in any way to reflect the views of the European 
Commission. 
CEPS Papers in Liberty and Security in Europe offer the views and critical reflections of CEPS researchers and external collaborators on 
key policy discussions surrounding the construction of the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. The series encompasses policy-
oriented and interdisciplinary academic studies and comment on the implications of Justice and Home Affairs policies within Europe 
and elsewhere in the world. 
Marco Stefan is a Research Fellow within the Justice and Home Affairs Section at CEPS. Gloria González Fuster is a Research Professor 
and a member of the Law, Science, Technology & Society Research Group at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel. The authors would like to 
express their gratitude for the invaluable comments and input by Sergio Carrera, Senior Research Fellow and Head of the Justice and 
Home Affairs Section at CEPS. 
   
 
978-94-6138-705-9 
Available for free downloading from the CEPS website (www.ceps.eu) © CEPS 2018 
CEPS ▪ Place du Congrès 1 ▪ B-1000 Brussels ▪ Tel: (32.2) 229.39.11 ▪ www.ceps.eu 
Cross-border Access to Electronic Data through 
Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters 
State of the art and latest developments in the EU and the US 
Marco Stefan and Gloria González Fuster 
No. 2018-07, November 2018 
Abstract 
In the digital age, access to data sought in the framework of a criminal investigation often entails the exercise 
of prosecuting powers over individuals and material that fall under another jurisdiction.  
Mutual legal assistance treaties, and the European Investigation Order allow for the lawful collection of 
electronic information in cross-border proceedings. These instruments rely on formal judicial cooperation 
between competent authorities in the different countries concerned by the investigative measure. By 
subjecting foreign actors’ requests for data to domestic independent judicial scrutiny, they guarantee that 
the information sought during an investigation is lawfully obtained and admissible in court.  
At the same time, pressure is mounting within the EU and in the US to allow law enforcement authorities’ 
access to data outside existing judicial cooperation channels. Initiatives such as the European Commission’s 
proposals on electronic evidence and the CLOUD Act in the US foster a model of direct private–public cross-
border cooperation under which service providers receive, assess and respond directly to a foreign law 
enforcement order to produce or preserve electronic information. 
This paper scrutinises these recent EU and US initiatives in light of the fundamental rights standards, rule of 
law touchstones, and secondary norms that, in the EU legal system, must be observed to ensure the lawful 
collection and exchange of data for criminal justice purposes. A series of doubts are raised as to the 
Commission e-evidence proposal and the CLOUD Act’s compatibility with the legality, necessity and 
proportionality benchmarks provided under EU primary and secondary law. 
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Executive summary 
EU standards applying to cross-border access to electronic data 
Access to electronic information for criminal law enforcement purposes constitutes an intrusive 
investigative measure that is likely to affect the fundamental rights of individuals. Given the 
transnational dimension of the internet, law enforcement quests for data also poses a series of 
jurisdictional challenges. Prosecuting authorities’ demands for information held by private 
companies and stored abroad, or in the cloud, often affect rules and responsibilities of other 
states concerned by the execution of the foreign investigative measure. Practice has shown how 
conflicts of law arise when law enforcement actors assert their powers over individuals and data 
that fall under another jurisdiction.  
In the post-Lisbon Treaty framework, regulating the access to and sharing of information in the 
fight against terrorism and crime is no longer an exclusive prerogative of Member States, but fall 
squarely within domains of competence (i.e. police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters) 
that are shared with the EU. The EU has progressively developed an EU criminal justice area that 
also addresses the gathering of data for purposes related to the prevention, detection, 
investigation and prosecution of crime. As a consequence, EU Member States have the obligation 
to ensure that domestic and foreign authorities’ cross-border access to and transfers of data are 
compatible with the fundamental rights and rule of law standards provided in the EU legal system.  
EU primary law guarantees the rights to privacy (Article 7 EU Charter) and data protection (Article 
8 EU Charter), as well as a set of criminal justice safeguards (Articles 47-50 EU Charter). 
Constitutional specificities and different legal traditions of EU countries provide further limits to 
criminal justice and law enforcement cooperation. These national and supranational standards 
must be adhered to by Member States, third countries, as well as private companies addressed 
by law enforcement authorities seeking EU data, regardless of factors such as the nationality of 
the data subject or the place of establishment of the service provider holding the data sought. 
Independent judicial oversight is necessary to ascertain that in the extraterritorial exercise of their 
criminal jurisdiction, foreign authorities remain bound by EU primary and secondary law, and 
respect national constitutional and criminal law. The case law of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union shows that this responsibility relies upon both the judicial authority issuing or 
validating a decision to enforce criminal jurisdiction across borders, and the courts of the EU 
country where such a cross-border law enforcement measure is to be executed. 
In fact, EU Member States’ criminal justice systems perform differently under important judicial 
independence indicators. Lack of judicial independence and ‘prosecutorial bias’ in issuing 
countries entail the risks of quasi-automatic approval of all data requests from the prosecutors, 
and constitute a danger not only for the fundamental rights of the persons concerned, but also 
for the independence of the judiciary and the EU rule of law as a whole. 
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EU legal framework for judicial cooperation on evidence gathering 
EU legal instruments for channelling cross-border requests for data gathering in criminal 
proceedings currently encompass mutual legal assistance treaties (MLATs) and the European 
Investigation Order (EIO). The EIO Directive only entered into force in May 2017, and its 
transposition is Member States’ national legislation is very recent. 
To date, a knowledge gap exists as to the exact ways in which this EU legal instrument and MLA 
agreements are implemented in judicial and administrative practices across EU Member State, as 
well as in bilateral cooperation frameworks with key international partners. That notwithstanding, 
the legal benchmarks provided under MLATs and the EIO cannot simply be disregarded by the EU 
or its Member States when undertaking further internal or external initiatives on data collection 
for criminal justice purposes. 
EU MLATs and the EIO rely on a model of formal judicial cooperation that subjects cross-border 
access and exchange of data to systematic independent judicial scrutiny. Such scrutiny is 
conducted in both the state seeking the information and the country where the investigative 
measure has to be executed. By ensuring that the right authorities are involved and that 
appropriate EU and national safeguards are taken into account, MLATs and the EIO allow the 
lawful collection of data across borders, and guarantee that the data obtained abroad are 
effectively admitted as evidence before the courts of the prosecuting state. 
The EIO, in particular, is intended to streamline and speed up judicial cooperation for access to 
data by extending the principle of mutual recognition to the field of evidence gathering in criminal 
proceeding. At the same time, it also calls upon the judicial authorities in the executing state to 
verify whether specific grounds of legitimate refusal to recognise and execute an EIO exist. These 
grounds, which are assessed before access to data is granted, are not limited to fundamental rights 
and conflict of law considerations, but also encompass cases where the execution of an EIO could 
lead to a breach of rules on immunity or privilege, or rules limiting criminal liability relating to 
freedom of the press, or where it could harm essential national security interests, or infringe the 
ne bis in idem principle. 
Introduction of direct cooperation instruments 
In the EU and the US, a number of initiatives are being developed to allow law enforcement 
authorities gather data outside the judicial cooperation channels provided by the MLATs and EIO. 
Initiatives such the US Clarifying Lawful Use of Overseas Data (CLOUD) Act, and the Commission’s 
proposals on e-evidence would allow law enforcement actors, and in particular police and 
prosecutors, to serve upon service providers orders directed at obtaining the disclosure and 
retention of data. The achievement of this goal will depend on the establishment of a “new” 
public–private framework of direct cooperation where service providers’ compliance with the 
orders is required, regardless of the location of the data solicited. In reality, such a method of 
direct cooperation is already followed in practice by certain countries. 
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US authorities, in particular, have consistently bypassed MLA channels to request data held by US 
companies abroad, including in the EU. The legality of the US authorities’ practice to order private 
companies to disclose data stored in the EU has been famously challenged in the Microsoft Ireland 
case. The dispute essentially questioned the lawfulness of extraterritorial assertion of US criminal 
jurisdiction in light of standing (i.e. pre-CLOUD Act) US legislation. The question, however, was far 
from being an exclusively domestic one. Foreign authorities’ unmediated access to data stored in 
the EU raises far-reaching issues also from the EU law perspective. 
The CLOUD Act 
Part I of the CLOUD Act formally grants US LEAs the power to order US private companies abroad 
to disclose the “content of a wire or electronic communication and any record of other 
information”. Part II paves the way for “executive agreements” that, when concluded, would allow 
non-US governments to directly request data of non-US persons from US-based companies. From 
an EU law perspective, a number of questions arise with regard to the CLOUD Act’s fitness to 
provide a sound legal basis for the gathering and transfer of data in the context of cross-border 
criminal proceedings. 
Doubts exist as to the possibility for US service providers located in the EU to transfer data 
exclusively based on warrants issued under the CLOUD Act, meaning outside any EU international 
agreement or legally binding instrument in force between the parties. The scope of having EU 
rules on cross-border transfers of personal data apply to a non-EU state is precisely to avoid that 
in the extraterritorial application of their domestic law, foreign authorities hamper the attainment 
of the protection that in the Union is granted to all natural persons.  
It is true that Article 49 of the General Data Protection Regulation allows for the possibility to 
derogate from mutual legal assistance processes. However, this provision does not seem to 
provide an appropriate EU legal basis to justify all transfers of data ordered by the US under the 
CLOUD Act, as such a norm permits data transfers “only if the transfer is not repetitive” and it 
“concerns only a limited number of data subjects”, in addition to needing to be accompanied by 
specific suitable safeguards. Under the CLOUD Act, US law enforcement authorities are instead 
given unlimited jurisdiction over any data (including content, metadata and subscriber 
information) controlled by US companies abroad.  
With regard to Part II of the CLOUD Act, serious doubts emerge as to the possibility for individual 
EU Member States to lawfully engage in the negotiation and conclusion of an executive agreement 
that would allow them to cooperate bilaterally in a field where the Union has undertaken 
extensive internal and external action. A fundamental EU law compatibility issue would arise also 
with regard to the disparity in the guarantees that under any given CLOUD Act executive 
agreement would be granted, on the one hand, to ‘United States persons’ and, on the other hand, 
to persons from the rest of the world – including EU citizens, and more generally anybody whose 
data must be protected under the EU Charter. 
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Any further initiative between the EU and the US would need to take into account the benchmarks 
of judicial cooperation provided under the MLA system. Exercising reciprocal judicial scrutiny over 
incoming LEA requests for data emerges in particular as an essential requirement under EU law. 
On the one hand, such scrutiny enables the protection of the subject whose data fall under EU 
law, as confirmed by the fact that under the EU–US MLA Agreement requests issued by US 
authorities directed at obtaining data stored in the EU by non-US companies have been refused 
on grounds such as the absence of dual criminality, a failure to demonstrate a nexus between the 
evidence sought and the criminal conducted alleged, and on the basis of essential interests. On 
the other hand, it serves the purpose of ensuring that EU citizens’ fundamental rights are 
appropriately guaranteed in the US.  
Proposals for European Production and Preservation Orders 
In April 2018, the European Commission tabled two legislative proposals on ‘electronic evidence’ 
(e-evidence) in criminal matters. The first is a proposal for a regulation that foresees the 
introduction of two new data-gathering tools, namely the European Production and Preservation 
Orders. The second consists of a proposal for a directive that would introduce an obligation for 
private companies in the EU to appoint “at least one” legal representative to act as a point of 
contact for Production and Preservation Orders issued by Member State LEAs. 
The proposed orders are qualified by the Commission as instruments of judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters. Accordingly, the legal basis selected for the proposed e-evidence regulation is 
Article 82(1)(d) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. This choice is 
questionable, as it does not seem to appropriately reflect the aim and content of the proposed 
measure. In fact, rather than promoting cooperation between judicial authorities of different 
Member States, the proposal seems to be concerned with the establishment of a public–private 
framework of cooperation under which service providers receive, assess and respond directly to 
foreign law enforcement requests to produce or preserve data, and are subject to sanctions in 
case they do not comply with an Order. 
The Commission claims that the ‘orders’ would bring into being a ‘new model’ of mutual 
recognition. However, EU primary law circumscribes the application of mutual recognition 
instruments to cooperation between competent Member State authorities. In particular, under 
existing mutual recognition procedures (and in particular the EIO), the execution of other Member 
States’ orders always requires the prior involvement of a judicial authority in the Member State 
where the addressee or the object concerned by the measure is located. 
Ascription of judicial authorities as the depositary of trust in EU criminal matters ultimately 
depends on the division of powers principle, which presumes their structural independence in 
assessing whether the execution of another Member State’s order will not infringe EU principles, 
laws and values. To the contrary, there is no general assumption of reciprocal trust between public 
authorities and private companies. 
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That notwithstanding, the proposed Regulation fails to ensure systematic independent judicial 
oversight, as it does not require independent judicial oversight in the country issuing the orders 
when these target specific categories of supposedly ‘less sensitive’ data (i.e. subscriber and access 
data). Also, the involvement of the competent judicial authorities of the Member State where the 
data or the company holding it is located is only eventual and accidental, being foreseen for solely 
in cases where the service provider decides not to execute the order. Under EU law, the 
competent judicial authorities of the country where the investigative measure should be executed 
have the duty not to do so when a refusal is justified by considerations related to inter alia 
fundamental rights concerns and/or the incompatibility of the order with the criminal justice 
standards provided by EU and domestic law. 
In a context where no systematic involvement of judicial authorities is ensured in relation to the 
ex ante assessment of the orders, the service provider might well be forced to execute an order 
that is not only unlawful under the law of the country where it is located (or represented), but 
also possibly incompatible with relevant provisions of the legal system of the issuing Member 
State. At the same time, the possibility of a company not objecting to a request for data when it 
should do so might undermine the very objective of the proposed measure, which is to allow data 
obtained across borders to be admitted as evidence before courts. 
Assessing the lawfulness of a cross-border investigative measure is simply not part of the statutory 
goals of private organisations that pursue exclusively commercial interests. Only independent 
judicial authorities possess the necessary institutional prerogatives and professional capacity to 
ensure an appropriate scrutiny of whether a legitimate ground subsists for refusing the execution 
of another Member State’s criminal law enforcement measure. Independent judicial oversight is 
also required to ensure that the legitimate interest of service providers in complying with a foreign 
authority’s order to transfer data sought in the framework of a criminal investigation does not 
override the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject.  
A series of doubts also emerge with regard to the compatibility of the European Production and 
Preservation Orders with the principles of necessity and proportionality. The Commission 
proposes that these measures are issued for all types of crimes (and without prior independent 
judicial validation) when subscriber and access data are sought. There is a risk of legalising ‘fishing 
expeditions’ whereby investigators order service providers to produce or preserve large troves of 
non-content data. When used to obtain content or transactional data, the new instruments could 
also lead to a problematic increase in the administrative burden in national judicial systems of the 
issuing states, with judges being potentially exposed to a large number of ‘orders’ to review. 
Furthermore, large discretion is left to individual Member States in establishing the different 
categories of crimes for an order related to the production of content and transactional data. The 
proposal could thus enable data processing in an unforeseeable manner across the Union, which 
would be in direct tension with EU fundamental rights requirements and the ned to maintain 
mutual trust within the EU criminal justice area.   
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1. Introduction  
The exponential use of internet services for daily communications and activities has led law 
enforcement authorities (LEAs)1 to increasingly rely on the access to and collection of electronic 
information for the investigation and prosecution of crime. 
Data transmitted in digital form and stored by private service providers2 in different countries 
are often considered valuable, if not indispensable, probatory sources. Granting law 
enforcement actors the possibility to swiftly gather different types of electronic data3 across 
borders is considered crucial not only for the countering of ‘cybercrime’ (both target and 
content-related), but also for the investigation and prosecution of criminal offences in the 
‘offline world’.4 
While working towards the establishment of an area of freedom, security and justice (AFSJ), 
the EU has progressively developed an EU criminal justice area. The latter addresses different 
aspects of intra-EU and international cross-border judicial cooperation in criminal matters, 
including investigative measures aimed at gathering evidence abroad. EU instruments for 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters provide investigating and prosecuting authorities with 
the possibility to issue requests directed at obtaining pieces of information, also in digital form, 
which are held by foreign service providers and/or located in another Member State within the 
Union, or in third countries such as the US. 
These instruments currently encompass mutual legal assistance treaties (MLATs), which 
represent the ‘classic’ international law instrument used for channelling cross-border requests 
for evidence gathering in criminal proceedings, and the European Investigation Order (EIO), 
which can be used to carry out investigative measures within the EU, based on the principle of 
mutual recognition of judicial decisions. Both the MLATs and the EIO adopt a mediated model 
for law enforcement cross-border access to electronic information that relies on formal judicial 
cooperation between pre-identified competent authorities in the different countries 
concerned (Carrera et al., 2015). This means that MLATs and the EIO subject cross-border 
                                                     
1 See the glossary in this report. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
4 From the perspective of the authority requesting the data, the cross-border element might depend on different 
factors, including the location of the data, the place where service providers have their main site or any other 
establishment and the place where the service provider offers services. The nationality and residence of the 
suspect and/or the victim also contribute to the cross-border and cross-jurisdictional nature of a request for data. 
See Internet & Jurisdiction Policy Network (2017), p. 10.  
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access and exchange of information for criminal justice purposes to independent judicial 
scrutiny in both the state seeking the information and the country where the final subject of 
the order is located. 
The ex ante involvement of independent judicial authorities is designed to prevent possible 
conflicts of law and jurisdictions that often arise when LEAs assert their powers abroad. Judicial 
scrutiny serves the purpose of mutually verifying that requests for access to data are consistent 
with the national, international and supranational standards and provisions respectively 
applying to the issuing and execution of cross-border investigative measures. For EU Member 
States, these standards and provisions are not just confined to domestic law, but also include 
EU rules and values. Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, EU countries have in fact 
had the responsibility to ensure that other EU Member States or third countries’ law 
enforcement actions performed in their territory or under their jurisdiction are compatible with 
EU law (Mitsilegas, 2016). 
Despite the existence of successful examples of cooperation under the mutual legal assistance 
(MLA) system (Bass, 2015; Kendall and Funk, 2014), and the EIO having entered into force only 
in May 2017 (that is, very recently), it is ever often argued that this model of formal judicial 
cooperation is ‘outdated’, and therefore ‘ineffective’, when it comes to the collection of data 
in the fight against crime (Swire et al., 2017, p. 324). Claims are made that the gathering of data 
for criminal justice purposes presents specific operational challenges that do not affect other 
investigative measures. These challenges would mainly derive from the ‘volatility’ of electronic 
information, because of which LEAs’ access to data under the jurisdiction of another state 
cannot be delayed by the cross-border and trans-jurisdictional nature of the request.5  
Current critiques of the MLATs and the EIO model focus on the delays associated with the 
obligation to subject cross-border requests for data to foreign judicial scrutiny. Repeated calls 
have subsequently been made to remove “obstacles to criminal investigations” in cyberspace,6 
in particular those stemming from standing EU (EIO) and international (MLA) rules on judicial 
cooperation for access to electronic information held by service providers. The underlying 
assumption is that the prosecution of crime could improve drastically in a context where law 
enforcement actors could attain electronic information directly from the service providers 
holding them, and without first having to obtain an authorisation from the judicial authorities 
of the country where the company holding the data is located.  
Nevertheless, far-reaching issues arise from the implementation of this cooperation model, 
which in practice allows law enforcement actors to request or even order service providers to 
disclose data stored abroad. The risk is that the execution of such a request or order violates 
the (national or supranational) law applying in the country concerned. The jurisdictional, legal 
and practical challenges that come from directly (i.e. non-judicially mediated) sending requests 
                                                     
5 European Commission (2018a), p. 20. 
6 European Commission (2015). 
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for access to electronic information held by service providers were made manifest in the long-
running dispute underlying the Microsoft Ireland v Department of Justice case.7 
The case originated in Microsoft’s refusal to execute a US warrant to disclose some data stored 
in the EU. This type of extraterritorial exercise of criminal jurisdiction is a longstanding practice 
of US LEAs.8 However, in the specific case the company challenged the US warrant’s power to 
reach overseas data. As discussed in section 3, the case, which had been pending appeal before 
the US Supreme Court, was ultimately dismissed. Meanwhile, policy and legislative efforts have 
been directed at the creation of new data-gathering tools for crime fighting across the Atlantic, 
but also within the EU. In the US, the signature of the Clarifying Lawful Use of Overseas Data 
(CLOUD) Act9 constituted a significant step in that direction. 
Days after the CLOUD Act was passed by US Congress, the European Commission tabled two 
legislative proposals on ‘electronic evidence’ (e-evidence) in criminal matters. The first is a 
proposal for a regulation10 that introduces two new data-gathering tools, namely the European 
Production Order and the Preservation Order. The second consists of a proposal for a 
directive11 that would introduce an obligation for service providers in the EU to appoint “at 
least one” legal representative to act as a point of contact responsible for receiving and 
executing Production and Preservation Orders issued by Member State LEAs. 
The CLOUD Act and the Commission’s proposals on e-evidence present their own differences 
and specificities, but they both espouse the model of so-called direct cooperation between law 
enforcement actors and service providers. These new measures aim at equipping prosecuting 
authorities with the power to obtain data directly from service providers, without going 
through pre-established channels of judicial cooperation. Since they represent a radical 
departure from the legal framework of cooperation established under the MLATs and the EIO, 
careful scrutiny is needed in order to verify their coherence with EU primary and secondary 
rules governing the collection and exchange of data for law enforcement purposes within the 
EU and in relation with third countries. 
One of the aims of the JUD-IT project is to identify the substantive and procedural standards 
that – in a post-Lisbon Treaty framework – govern cross-border access to electronic data for 
criminal justice purposes. In this vein, this state-of-the-art report undertakes the following: 
i) it identifies the EU constitutional fundamental rights and rule of law safeguards that 
must be incorporated into EU (internal and external) criminal justice instruments 
                                                     
7 Warrant to Search a Certain Email Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp. 3. 15 F. Supp. 3d 466 
(S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
8 Stored Communications Act (SCA), codified at 18 U.S.C. Chapter 121 §§ 2701–2712. Under the SCA, US law 
enforcement actors are authorised to compel US providers to disclose information about a person, regardless of 
both the nationality of the data subject and the localisation of the data.  
9 Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data (CLOUD Act), S. 2383, H.R. 4943.  
10 European Commission (2018c), hereinafter, the ‘proposed Regulation’. 
11 European Commission (2018c), hereinafter, the ‘proposed Directive’. 
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regulating the gathering and exchange of data held by private companies. Attention is 
especially given to the conditions to be met in order to ensure adequate levels of privacy 
and data protection as well as effective judicial remedies vis-à-vis prosecuting 
authorities seeking access to electronic information in the context of criminal 
proceedings. These are key requirements that must be satisfied for law enforcement 
access to data to be legal under EU law (section 2);  
ii) analyses how and to what extent the EU primary law standards have been embedded 
in existing criminal justice instruments for cross-border cooperation in the field of 
evidence gathering. In particular, an overview is provided of the ways in which the EU 
MLATs and the EIO function as avenues of criminal justice cooperation that, while 
enabling data gathering across borders, also respond to issues concerning conflicts of 
law, mutual trust and fundamental rights compliance, proportionality and domestic 
constitutional specificity, and protection of citizens before third countries (section 3); 
and 
iii) provides a preliminary qualitative assessment of the Commission’s proposals on e-
evidence in light of EU primary and secondary law standards. A set of critical questions 
is posed with regard to the legal basis chosen for the proposals. In relation to the 
content of the latter, particular attention is paid to legality, necessity and 
proportionality aspects, as well as to issues of compliance with EU rules on privacy and 
data protection. Thought is also given to the legal and practical challenges that would 
arise from the execution, enforcement and review of the proposed European 
Production and Preservations Orders (section 4). 
The research conducted for this report is intended to lay the groundwork for more in-depth 
analysis and for the development of further expert discussions as part of the JUD-IT project. 
Information collected and analysed for this report was obtained through desk research. To 
complement and validate the research, 16 face-to-face semi-structured interviews were held 
between May and September 2018 with relevant stakeholders. The latter included officials 
from the European Commission and Member States, US government representatives, civil 
society actors, service providers and legal practitioners as well as academics based in Brussels 
and Washington.  
2. EU primary law standards and cross-border access to data for criminal justice 
purposes 
2.1. Privacy and criminal justice standards 
In the post-Lisbon Treaty framework, rules on the access to and sharing of information in the 
fight against terrorism and crime are no longer an exclusive prerogative of Member States, but 
fall squarely within areas of competence (i.e. police and judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters) that are shared with the EU. 
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The ‘Lisbonisation’ of the AFSJ granted a full role to the European Commission in enforcing EU 
legal standards in these domains, provided for their democratic scrutiny by the European 
Parliament, and entrusted the monitoring of their effective implementation to judicial control. 
The latter is performed by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), as well as EU 
Member States’ competent courts. 
Depending on whether access to electronic data is conducted for the purpose of policing 
activities12 or for formal judicial proceedings in criminal matters,13 particular sets of EU rules 
apply. The specific and practical aim along with the content of instruments regulating cross-
border access to data is central to determining their pertinent legal basis, as well as to 
identifying the corresponding regulatory framework to take into account in their design and 
implementation.14 
The JUD-IT project focuses on the standards and rules that concern the gathering and exchange 
of data for criminal justice purposes (i.e. in the context of criminal proceedings). That 
notwithstanding, it is important to recall that a number of EU primary law safeguards apply 
across all areas of EU law, including those referred to in Title V of Part Three of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and relating to the AFSJ.15 Their consistent 
application to all activities entailing access to and exchange of data in the fight against crime is 
required to prevent that such initiatives translate into arbitrary or unjustified interferences with 
individuals’ rights.  
Of special relevance in this context are the guarantees that the European Union Charter of 
Fundamental Rights (EU Charter) sets forth with regard to the right to respect for private life 
(Article 7) and the right to data protection (Article 8).16 These rights, which are distinct even 
though they can be described as mutually reinforcing each other (Mitsilegas and Vavoula 2018), 
fully apply to EU and Member State policies in the fields of police and judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters. The CJEU has made clear they need to be assessed also in conjunction with 
Article 47 of the Charter, on access to judicial remedies.17 
The CJEU has progressively clarified that any limitation of the fundamental rights of respect for 
private life and data protection must be limited to what is strictly necessary, and outlined the 
implications of such a principle.18 The Court in Luxembourg also provided detailed guidance on 
how EU and Member States’ initiatives entailing the transfer of data across borders to third 
                                                     
12 Article 82(21)(d) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 
13 Article 87(2) TFEU. 
14 See notably Opinion 1/15 of the Court (Grand Chamber) on the EU–Canada PNR Agreement, 26 July 2017 
[ECLI:EU:C:2017:592]. 
15 As recognised in Declaration 21 of the Lisbon Treaty. 
16 Article 16 TFEU and Article 39 of the Treaty on European Union provide new legal bases, which require that all 
EU policy areas, including law enforcement, ensure a comprehensive level of data protection. 
17 See Case C-362/14, Maximilian Schrems [ECLI:EU:C:2015:650]. 
18 See Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland [ECLI:EU:C:2014:238], and Joined Cases  C-203/15 
and C-698/15 Tele2 Sverige and Tom Watson [ECLI:EU:C:2016:970], para. 96. 
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countries, for purposes including the prevention, detection or prosecution of terrorist offences 
or serious transnational crime, must also be limited to what is strictly necessary, meaning the 
legislation entailing the limitation of the fundamental rights to the right to respect for private 
life and data protection must lay down clear and precise rules governing the scope and 
application of the measure in question and imposing minimum safeguards, so that the persons 
whose data has been transferred have sufficient guarantees to protect effectively their 
personal data against the risk of abuse, and indicating, in particular, what circumstances and 
under which conditions a measure providing for the processing of such data may be adopted.19 
When cross-border access to data by law enforcement is sought for a criminal investigation, it 
must also be compatible with EU criminal justice standards. These chiefly include the right to 
an effective remedy and to a fair trial, respect for the presumption of innocence and the right 
of defence, the principles of legality and proportionality of criminal offences and penalties, and 
the ne bis in idem principle (Articles 47–50 EU Charter).20 Procedural guarantees embedded in 
national constitutional and criminal justice traditions provide further limits to criminal justice 
cooperation between EU Member State authorities (Cape et al., 2010). On several occasions, 
the constitutional courts in Member States have stressed that in the implementation of EU 
criminal justice measures (e.g. a European Arrest Warrant), national authorities cannot bypass 
other EU countries’ constitutional checks and balances (Hong, 2016).  
It is clear that the decision to issue cross-border requests for access to data largely depends on 
Member States’ criminal law provisions. National legislation also outlines the procedural rules 
and identifies the oversight systems that apply to the issuing of cross-border requests for access 
to data. At the same time, the EU institutions and the Member States have the obligation to 
ensure that both domestic and foreign LEA requests for electronic data held by private 
companies do not expose individuals to the risk of violations of the fundamental rights they are 
entitled to under the EU Charter and national constitutions. 
Therefore, if they are to comply with relevant fundamental rights and rule of law standards 
provided at the national and supranational levels (and stand the test of legality under Union 
law), EU and Member State initiatives directed at enabling law enforcement access to 
electronic information held by private companies across borders must plan for the involvement 
of effective oversight mechanisms (Carrera and Stefan, 2018, pp. 13-18). These mechanisms 
are in particular necessary to monitor that the gathering of data is consistent with the national 
and EU fundamental rights and rule of law standards that apply to criminal investigations, and 
access to data in this specific context. 
Against this backdrop, independent judicial scrutiny over the issuing and execution of requests 
for data emerges as essential. The involvement of independent judicial authorities is first of all 
                                                     
19 Opinion 1/15, notably para. 141. 
20 Other rights potentially impacted by LEAs’ cross-border access to electronic information include the right to 
non-discrimination (Article 21 EU Charter), freedom of movement (Article 45 EU Charter), freedom of expression 
(Article 11 EU Charter), and freedom of assembly and of association (Article 12 EU Charter). See Galli (2018). 
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required to verify that data located across the border are requested by prosecuting authorities 
and disclosed by companies in a lawful way, this being a precondition for electronic information 
to be admitted as evidence in court (Carrera and Mitsilegas, 2017). Furthermore, the judicial 
assessment of requests issued by foreign authorities is also necessary to ascertain that, in the 
extraterritorial exercise of their criminal jurisdiction, the latter remain bound to EU primary and 
secondary law, and respect national constitutional and criminal law applying to the collection 
and processing of data for criminal justice purposes. 
When undertaken before the disclosure of the data sought for criminal investigations, 
independent judicial oversight increases legal certainty and avoids the conflict of laws that 
typically arises when multiple jurisdictions governed by different constitutional and criminal 
law traditions (e.g. adversarial or inquisitorial) are involved in transnational law enforcement 
actions. In substance, the judicialisation of supranational and international cooperation on 
evidence gathering helps to maintain trust among the parties concerned in a cross-border 
criminal proceeding (both intra-EU and with third countries). 
Contrary to what happens in the context of police or internal security activities, cross-border 
access to data conducted through judicial cooperation in criminal matters is designed to ensure 
the reliability and accuracy of the information requested, accessed and shared, as well as the 
lawfulness of the proceedings. 
2.2. The role of independent judicial scrutiny in cross-border criminal proceedings 
Within the AFSJ, cross-border cooperation in criminal matters is firmly based on the principle 
of mutual recognition of judicial decisions between Member States’ authorities. Judiciaries of 
the Member States are requested to execute each other’s decisions based on the assumption 
that they fully comply with the EU’s foundational principles, as provided under Article 2 of the 
Treaty on European Union (TEU) and corresponding international obligations (Bárd, 2018). 
The mutual recognition principle is based on the presumption that all EU countries’ legal and 
institutional systems provide sufficient fundamental rights and rule of law safeguards. Such a 
presumption is generally referred to as mutual trust (Van Ballegooij, 2015, p. 354). Ascription 
of judicial authorities as the depositary of trust in EU criminal matters ultimately depends on 
the division of powers principle,21 which presumes their structural independence in assessing 
whether the execution of another Member State’s order will not infringe EU principles, laws 
and values.22 
                                                     
21 See European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) (2016), p. 21, para. 74. 
22 According to the definition provided by the European Commission, the principles upon which the EU rule of law 
concept rests include legality, which implies a transparent, accountable, democratic and pluralistic process for 
enacting laws; legal certainty; prohibition of arbitrariness of the executive powers; independent and impartial 
courts; effective judicial review including respect for fundamental rights; and equality before the law. See 
European Commission (2014), p. 4. 
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Mutual trust is in fact not unconditional, as confirmed by the automatic execution of cross-
border judicial decisions under the mutual recognition principle being subject to exceptions 
and derogations. These exceptions can be activated when a judicial authority in the country 
required to recognise another Member State’s criminal law measure (including cross-border 
investigative measures and data-gathering requests) finds that its execution would expose the 
concerned individual to a risk of a violation of the fundamental rights and rule of law standards 
provided under EU law. 
This ‘rebutability’ of the mutual trust principle has been repeatedly affirmed in a number of 
judgments in which the CJEU has had to assess the extent to which the fundamental rights of 
criminal suspects should be taken into account by the national court executing another 
Member State’s law enforcement measure. In its landmark decision in the joint Aranyosi and 
Căldăraru cases, the Court stressed that judicial scrutiny in the executing country is needed to 
adequately test and ascertain human rights compliance on the ground, and on the basis of 
concrete evidence. In fact, executing authorities have the responsibility to postpone, and 
eventually refuse, the execution of another EU country decision if there are “substantial 
grounds” to believe that the individual concerned would be exposed to a real risk of inhuman 
or degrading treatment, within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter.23 
The Court established a “two-step procedure” to be applied by an executing judicial authority 
in order to assess the existence of a ground justifying exceptions to the operationalisation of 
the principle of mutual recognition in criminal matters. That authority must, first of all, make a 
finding of general or systemic deficiencies in the protections provided in the issuing Member 
State and, then, seek all necessary supplementary information from the issuing Member State’s 
judicial authority as to the protections for the individual concerned. If the existence of a real 
risk cannot be discounted within a reasonable time, the Court concluded that the executing 
judicial authority must decide whether the cross-border procedure should be brought to an 
end.24 
Most recently, the Court has confirmed that mutual recognition in criminal matters should be 
halted, by way of exception, when the executing judicial authority has objective, reliable, 
specific and properly updated material25 indicating that systemic or generalised deficiencies 
affecting the independence of the issuing Member State’s judiciary expose the suspect’s right 
to a fair trial to a real risk. In fact, “the high level of trust” on which judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters is based relies on the premise that the criminal courts of Member States meet 
the requirement of effective judicial protection which include, in particular, the independence 
                                                     
23 Joined Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU Aranyosi and Căldăraru, Judgment of 5 April 2016 
[ECLI:EU:C:2016:198], para. 104. 
24 Ibid., para. 104. 
25 Such as that set out in a reasoned proposal of the European Commission adopted pursuant to Article 7(1) TEU. 
See Case C-216/18 PPU Minister for Justice and Equality v LM (Deficiencies in the system of justice), Judgment of 
25 July 2018 [ECLI:EU:C:2018:586], para. 79. 
CROSS-BORDER ACCESS TO ELECTRONIC DATA THROUGH JUDICIAL COOPERATION IN CRIMINAL MATTERS | 9 
 
and impartiality of those courts.26 At the basis of the CJEU decision in Case C-216/18 PPU LM, 
is the consideration that judicial independence is an essential corollary of the effective judicial 
protection principle (Article 19 TEU) and a requirement stemming from the right to an effective 
remedy before a tribunal (Article 47 EU Charter). In substance, the CJEU confirmed that it is the 
responsibility of national courts to halt or suspend judicial cooperation if doubts arise as to 
respect for the rule of law in the issuing state (Van Ballegooij and Bárd, 2018). 
Judicial scrutiny by executing Member State authorities is therefore crucial, especially in a 
context where the Member States’ criminal justice systems perform differently under 
important judicial independence indicators.27 At the EU level, these indicators include factors 
such as the procedures for the appointment or dismissal of judges, as well as the organisation 
and functioning of prosecution services.28 The reasoned proposal submitted by the Commission 
to activate the Article 7 TEU mechanism, and the two infringement procedures based on Article 
258 TFEU launched in response to the Polish legislative measures adopted for judiciaries29 
prove that restrictions imposed upon judicial independence in one Member State have far-
reaching consequences for other countries of the Union. 
National courts are to ensure “the full application of European Union law (…) and (…) judicial 
protection of an individual’s rights under that law”. 30 The case law of the Luxembourg Court 
shows that this responsibility relies upon both the judicial authority issuing or validating a 
decision to enforce criminal jurisdiction across borders, and the courts of the EU country where 
such a cross-border law enforcement measure is to be executed. However, systemic 
dysfunctionalities arise when one of the two parties involved in cross-border judicial 
cooperation no longer operates under the rule of law, and notably does not meet the minimum 
standards of independence from the executive that are needed to safeguard the persons 
concerned in a criminal proceeding.31 
The CJEU has provided important clarifications in respect of who qualifies as an independent 
judge under EU law. The Court has stressed that the term ‘judicial authority’ can refer to 
Member States’ judges, courts and national authorities required to participate in administering 
criminal justice.32 This definition does not encompass administrative authorities such as 
                                                     
26 Ibid., para. 58. 
27 As shown in the 2018 EU Justice Scoreboard, in some EU Member States the executive has a “strong influence” 
on the appointment and dismissal of court presidents. See European Commission (2018f), pp. 41-44.  
28 At the EU level, assessment of the independence of Member States’ judges and prosecutors is conducted in 
light of the standards elaborated by the Council of Europe. See, in particular, Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12 
of the Council of Europe Council of Ministers to Member Stares on judges and Recommendation Rec(2000)19 on 
the role of the public prosecution in the criminal justice system, adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the 
Council of Europe in October 2000, paras 4, 11, 13 and 34.  
29 The two infringement procedures concern the Polish law on the ordinary courts organisation (C-192/18) and 
the Polish law on the Supreme Court. See European Commission (2018d).  
30 See Opinion 1/09 of the Court (Full Court), 8 March 2011 [ECLI:EU:C:2011:123]. 
31 See United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (2018).  
32 In Cases C-452/16 PPU Poltorak of 10 November 2016 [ECLI:EU:C:2016:858], C-477/16 PPU Kovalkovas of 10 
November 2016 [ECLI:EU:C:2016:861],  and C-453/16 PPU Özcelik [ECLI:EU:C:2016:860], of 10 November 2016. 
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ministries or police authorities, which are “within the province of the executive”.33 Such an 
exclusion is justified in light of the need to respect the rule of law and the principle of separation 
of powers on the one hand, and the need to uphold mutual trust stemming from the 
judicialisation of cooperation on the other (Carrera and Mitsilegas, 2018). 
The Court has recently highlighted the importance of judicial independence in the EU legal 
system. This emerges from the CJEU’s decision in the case Associação Sindical dos Juízes 
Portugueses of 28 February 2018,34 which dealt with the legality of a reduction in the 
remuneration of public officials and judges in Portugal due to its interference with the principle 
of judicial independence. In this ruling, the Court also provided the first interpretation of Article 
47 of the EU Charter, and specifically of the right to an effective remedy and fair trial:  
The principle of the effective judicial protection of individuals’ rights under EU law, 
referred to in the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, is a general principle of 
EU law stemming from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, 
which has been enshrined in Articles 6 and 13 of the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 
November 1950, and which is now reaffirmed by Article 47 of the Charter.  
The ruling goes on to state that  
the very existence of effective judicial review designed to ensure compliance with EU 
law is of the essence of the rule of law.35 
In this decision, the Court also provided a clear set of conceptual features determining the 
extent to which a judicial authority is ‘independent’ for the purposes of EU law, by stating “the 
factors to be taken into account in assessing whether a body is a ‘court or tribunal’ include, 
inter alia, whether the body is established by law, whether it is permanent, whether its 
jurisdiction is compulsory, whether its procedure is inter partes, whether it applies rules of law 
and whether it is independent”.36 
In this same ruling, the CJEU confirmed that “ensuring judicial review in the EU legal order” is 
not only “a responsibility of the Court of Justice but also [of] national courts and tribunals”. 
Article 19(1) TEU states that “Member States shall provide remedies sufficient to ensure 
effective legal protection in the fields covered by Union law” (emphasis added), which include 
criminal justice and the gathering of evidence in this domain. By specifying effective judicial 
protection as a general principle of EU law, and defining who qualifies as an independent 
judicial authority in EU law, the Court set important benchmarks for testing the legality of EU 
and international policy initiatives to introduce criminal law instruments allowing unmediated 
access to electronic data (Carrera and Mitsilegas, 2018). 
                                                     
33 Ibid., para. 35. 
34 Case C-64/16 [ECLI:EU:C:2018:117]. 
35 Ibid., paras. 35 and 36 (emphasis added). 
36 Ibid., para. 38.  
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The CJEU has in fact clearly established as a criterion to determine compliance with the 
principle of proportionality in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 52(1) of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights the need to make access by the competent national authorities to 
communications data dependent on a prior review carried out by a court or by an independent 
administrative body, whose decision seeks to limit access to the data and their use to what is 
strictly necessary for the purpose of attaining the objective pursued, and which intervenes 
following a reasoned request of those authorities submitted within the framework of 
procedures of prevention, detection or criminal prosecutions.37 Thus, the access to such data 
by competent national authorities shall only be regarded as constituting a lawful limitation of 
the EU fundamental rights to the right to respect for private life, and of the right to the 
protection of personal data, if carried out after such prior independent scrutiny. 
The prior review by a court or independent administrative body is essential to ensure respect 
of the principle according to which access to data needs always to be limited to what is strictly 
necessary, based on objective criteria defining the circumstances and conditions of such 
access.38 When based on laws allowing to grant access to data with the objective of fighting 
serious crime, access should be granted only to the data of individuals suspected of planning, 
committing or having committed a serious crime or of being implicated in one way or another 
in such a crime.39 In particular situations, for example concerning vital national security, 
defence or public security interests are threatened by terrorist activities, access to the data of 
other persons might also be granted, but only if there is objective evidence from which it can 
be deduced that the data might, in a specific case, make an effective contribution to combating 
such activities.40  
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) also recently determined that in an EU Member 
State (the United Kingdom) the acquisition by a public authority of communications data from 
a communications services provider required that data access be subject to prior review by a 
court or independent administrative body.41 Otherwise, the requirement derived from its own 
case law regarding the need for any interference with the rights of Article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) to be “in accordance with the law” could not be regarded 
as fulfilled. The ECtHR reached such conclusion by taking into account already referred CJEU 
case law.42 
Additionally, the ECtHR stressed that the lack of prior review by a court or independent 
administrative body in every case where there is a request for the communications data of a 
journalist, or where such collateral intrusion is likely, must be regarded as a violation of the 
                                                     
37 Digital Rights Ireland, para. 62.  
38 Tele2 Sverige AB, para. 118. 
39 Ibid., para. 119.  
40 Idem.  
41 Judgment of the Court (First Section) of 13 September 2018, Case of Big Brother Watch and Others v the United 
Kingdom [ ECLI:CE:ECHR:2018:0913JUD005817013]; see especially paras. 463, 466 and 467. 
42 In particular the Digital Rights Ireland judgment. 
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rights recognised in Article 10 of the ECHR,43 on the right to freedom of expression and 
information. 
Provided that important differences exist among Member States in terms of administrative 
bodies that qualify as independent (Mitsilegas and Vavoula, 2018), the question arises as to 
how to ensure EU fundamental rights and rule of law standards – and specially to satisfy the 
effective judicial protection requirement – when the requesting country gathers data directly 
from the private company holding or controlling it. By granting LEAs the power to obtain data 
directly from private companies, initiatives such as the CLOUD Act and the Commission’s 
proposal for Production and Preservation Orders aim at equipping LEAs with new tools that will 
speed up the gathering of data located outside their country’s territory. 
Nevertheless, to qualify as judicial cooperation in criminal matters, the cross-border gathering 
of electronic data cannot fall short of systematically ensuring that independent judicial scrutiny 
is carried out in both the country issuing the request (or order) and the country where the data 
are stored, and before the access to data is granted. Ensuring that the persons concerned by 
cross-border requests for access to data are covered by the guarantees provided under EU law 
becomes challenging in the absence of independent scrutiny by judicial authorities in the 
requested state to validate the lawfulness of accessing and processing data. 
3. EU secondary law on cross-border evidence gathering for criminal justice 
purposes 
The EU has engaged in extensive internal and external action in the fields of criminal justice and 
data protection, and over time has developed a normative framework for judicial cooperation 
governing the gathering and exchange of evidence in the context of cross-border criminal 
proceedings taking place within the EU or at the international level. 
MLATs (signed respectively with the US and Japan) and the EIO enable the transmission of 
requests (and responses to requests) for electronic information sought in the framework of a 
domestic criminal investigation, but held across borders. Both the MLATs and the EIO adopt a 
model of formal judicial cooperation designed to ensure that cross-border requests for data 
respect the sovereignty of the foreign country on whose territory an investigative measure 
needs to be implemented.44 
Most notably, EU Member States have the responsibility to ensure that foreign cross-border 
transfers of data falling under EU jurisdiction are compatible with the fundamental rights and 
rule of law standards provided in the EU legal system. These standards must be adhered to by 
all Member States as well as private companies addressed by third countries’ authorities 
seeking EU data, regardless of factors such as the nationality of the data subject or the place of 
establishment of the service provider holding the data sought. The lack of a direct ‘interest’ in 
                                                     
43 Ibid., paras. 496-499. 
44 European Commission (2018a), p. 22. 
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the criminal prosecution of the Member State where the company is located (or legally 
represented) cannot exempt the authorities of that country from their obligation to verify that 
foreign requests for data are processed in compliance with both domestic and EU rules. 
3.1. Mutual legal assistance and the EU legal framework for transatlantic data transfer 
in criminal proceedings 
MLATs, which are the traditional channel of cooperation for cross-border gathering and 
exchange of electronic information, are currently used by EU Member States in cases where 
cross-border criminal proceedings concern a Member State that does not participate in the EIO 
Directive, such as Denmark and Ireland. Available MLA instruments for intra-EU cooperation 
include the 1959 Council of Europe Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters and 
its Protocols (‘1959 MLA Convention’), the Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement 
and the 2000 Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member 
States (‘2000 EU MLA Convention’) and its Protocol.  
As for relations with third countries, more specifically transatlantic cooperation, the already 
mentioned EU–US MLA Agreement complements existing bilateral treaties and amends some 
of their provisions, if they provide for less effective avenues of cooperation between EU 
Member States and the US.45 As submitted by the Commission, the Agreement “largely relies 
on existing and future bilateral agreements with particular [Member States]”.46 If the 
Agreement supplements existing bilateral agreements, “the latter do not operate in isolation 
from Union Law”.47 For Member States that do not yet have an agreement with the US, the 
EU–US MLAT may provide a suitable legal basis for cooperation. The standards set by the EU–
US Agreement are also “a benchmark” for the conclusion of future bilateral agreements in the 
field between Member States and the US.48 
Exchange of evidence under MLATs relies on the involvement of different authorities, including 
the political bodies and judicial actors responsible for supervising and examining cross-border 
requests for evidence gathering against domestic standards. The exact ways in which MLA 
requests are issued and processed largely depends on the specific constitutional tradition and 
relevant legal framework of the countries concerned (Carrera et al., 2015, pp. 7-8). Despite 
respecting national specificities, a consistent feature of the MLA process is the mediation by 
the competent national authorities required to ensure that the cross-border request for access 
to electronic information is in line with the legal and procedural requirements of the requested 
country. 
                                                     
45 See Article 3(2)(a) of the EU–US MLA Agreement.  
46 European Commission (2018a), p. 23.  
47 Council of the European Union (2016a), p. 3. 
48 Ibid. 
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Figure 1 provides a schematic description of the different steps and authorities involved in the 
processing of an MLA request issued by EU Member State authorities for obtaining electronic 
data in the US.  
Figure 1. US processing of EU Member State MLA requests for data 
 
Note: OIA = Office for International Affairs. 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 
 
EU law enforcement requests for access to data stored in the US are assessed against the 
probable cause standard under the Fourth Amendment49 and specific provisions of statutes, 
such as the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), which protects wire, oral and 
electronic communications in transit.  
The Stored Communications Act (SCA), which is contained in Title II of the ECPA, is a blocking 
statute that limits the possibility for foreign governments to directly request content data held 
by IT companies in the US, by subjecting their possibility to access electronic information to the 
requirement of independent judicial validation. While foreign LEAs can directly ask IT 
companies to disclose non-content data (which respond on a voluntary basis), the content of 
                                                     
49 The Fourth Amendment limits the government’s ability to conduct searches and seizures, and warrants can be 
issued only with independent review by a judge. The Fourth Amendment governs more than simply a person’s 
home or body; its protections apply specifically to communications, covering a person’s “papers and effects”. 
Probable cause that a crime has been committed must be established by the law enforcement officer by 
“reasonably trustworthy information” that is sufficient to cause a reasonably prudent person to believe that an 
offence has been or is being committed or that evidence will be found in the place that is to be searched. 
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electronic communications might only be produced when a US federal judge has been satisfied 
of the existence of “probable cause”.50 
For certain categories of information, the ECPA would require less than probable cause. For 
instance, the statute specifies that data or electronic communications that have been in storage 
for more than 180 days can be produced upon the issue of a subpoena or a court order, which 
occurs when a judge is persuaded of the existence of ‘specific and articulable facts’ enabling 
the assumption that the requested data are relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation. Still, 
federal appellate courts have progressively extended application of the probable cause 
requirement to these requests.51 In any case, LEAs cannot be exempted from the obligation to 
obtain an independent judge’s authorisation to access content data stored in the US.  
Under the MLA process, in substance, the foreign case is subject to the same standards and 
protections as a national case. The same principle should also apply to US requests for data 
held in the EU. Nevertheless, the practice adopted by US authorities has consistently been to 
bypass MLA channels to request data held by US companies abroad, including in the EU. In 
these cases, US authorities follow the same domestic process as if the data were located in the 
US.52 Following this approach, an MLA request would only be issued if the data were held 
abroad by a non-US company. This US practice of bypassing MLA channels might contribute to 
explaining the imbalance in numbers of outgoing and incoming requests under the EU–US MLA 
Agreement. Estimations made in the context of the 2016 EU–US MLA Review exercise revealed 
a 4:1 ratio of requests to the US compared with requests coming from the US. 
The legality of the US authorities’ practice to order private companies to disclose data stored 
in the EU has been challenged in the already mentioned Microsoft Ireland case. The dispute 
essentially questioned the lawfulness of extraterritorial assertion of US criminal jurisdiction in 
light of standing (i.e. pre-CLOUD Act) domestic legislation. The US Department of Justice argued 
that its warrant authority under the SCA required US-based companies to turn over the 
requested data, regardless of where the latter were stored. Microsoft, by contrast, defended 
that this authority did not extend to data located outside United States territory.  
The question, however, was far from being an exclusively domestic one. Foreign authorities’ 
unmediated (extra-MLA) access to data stored in the EU raises far-reaching issues also from the 
EU law perspective. As already observed, the risk of a conflict of laws, or, more directly, of 
violation of EU standards, emerges if foreign investigators’ requests for electronic data falling 
                                                     
50 LEAs must prove that an offence has been or is being committed or that evidence will be found in the place that 
is to be searched. 
51 In the United States v Warshak case (2010), the Sixth Circuit broadened the interpretation of the Fourth 
Amendment’s guarantees expanding the probable cause standard also to communication that has been in storage 
for more than 180 days. In Riley v California (2014), the Supreme Court stated that “the police generally may not, 
without a warrant, search digital information on a mobile phone seized from an individual who has been arrested”. 
In the Carpenter v United States case (2018), the Supreme Court ruled that in order to obtain mobile phone 
tracking information (metadata/non-content), law enforcement authorities needed a warrant. 
52 In addition, the ‘Bank of Nova Scotia’ doctrine allows for subpoenas (instead of search warrants) to be sent to a 
US-based company to produce evidence stored outside the US. See Kyriakides (2014).  
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under EU jurisdiction are not assessed in light of the rule of law guarantees and fundamental 
freedoms (encompassing both criminal justice and privacy-related rights) provided under EU 
primary and secondary law; in particular, if personal data affected by subsequent data transfers 
do not benefit from a level of protection ‘essentially equivalent’ to the protection granted 
under EU law.53 EU fundamental rights safeguards are binding upon EU Member States as well 
as foreign countries and private companies, and are granted to everyone regardless of 
nationality. 
With the introduction of the CLOUD Act, the US intended to establish a (US and international) 
legal and operational framework for LEAs across the Atlantic to obtain data directly from 
companies abroad. Part I of the Act 54 formally grants US LEAs the power to order private 
companies to disclose the “content of a wire or electronic communication and any record of 
other information” about a person, regardless of either the nationality of the latter or the 
location of the data. Providers can also be ordered to preserve data in their possession for up 
to 180 days prior to the issuance of any compulsory process. Part II of the CLOUD Act,55 on the 
other hand, enables the conclusion of “executive agreements” between the US government 
and “qualifying foreign powers”. These agreements will allow non-US governments to directly 
request the data of non-US persons from US-based companies without going through the MLA 
process. These requests would be compulsory upon the companies based on the law of the 
issuing country. 
From an EU law perspective, a number of questions arise with regard to the CLOUD Act’s fitness 
to provide a sound legal basis for the gathering and transfer of data in the context of cross-
border criminal proceedings. Article 48 of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)56 
states: 
Any judgment of a court or tribunal and any decision of an administrative authority of 
a third country requiring a controller or processor to transfer or disclose personal data 
may only be recognised or enforceable in any manner if based on an international 
agreement, such as a mutual legal assistance treaty, in force between the requesting 
third country and the Union or a Member State, without prejudice to other grounds 
for transfer pursuant to this Chapter.57 
What Part I of the CLOUD Act appears to authorise, instead, is the transfer of personal data 
falling under EU jurisdiction exclusively upon the order of US authorities, meaning outside any 
EU international agreement or legally binding instrument in force between the parties.  
                                                     
53 Schrems, para. 73.  
54 Section 103 of the CLOUD Act. 
55 Ibid., Section 105. 
56 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of 
natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and 
repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation). 
57 Article 48 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (emphasis added). 
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In its amicus curiae brief submitted on behalf of the EU to the Supreme Court in the Microsoft 
Ireland case, 58 the European Commission recognised that a company might have a “legitimate 
interest” in complying with a foreign authority’s order to transfer data sought in the framework 
of a criminal investigation. A refusal to comply with the order could, in fact, lead the company 
to be subject to a legal action in a non-EU state (i.e. the US). That notwithstanding, the 
Commission also made clear that EU law only allows such transfers where the company’s 
legitimate interest is not “overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of 
the data subject which require protection of personal data”.59 The reason for having EU rules 
on transfers of personal data to a non-EU state is precisely to avoid that – in the extraterritorial 
application of their domestic law – foreign authorities hamper the attainment of the protection 
that in the Union is provided to all natural persons. 
It is true that Article 49 of the GDPR provides for the possibility to derogate from MLA 
processes. However, this norm does not seem to provide an appropriate EU legal basis to justify 
all transfers of data ordered by the US under the CLOUD Act. Under this specific GDPR provision, 
data transfers are permissible “only if the transfer is not repetitive”, if it “concerns only a limited 
number of data subjects” and only if “the controller has assessed all the circumstances 
surrounding the data transfer and has on the basis of that assessment provided suitable 
safeguards with regard to the protection of personal data”. Article 49 explicitly concerns 
“derogations for specific situations”, and must be interpreted strictly. Under the CLOUD Act, 
US authorities are instead given unlimited jurisdiction over any data (including content, 
metadata and subscriber information) controlled by US companies abroad.  
With regard to CLOUD Act provisions related to the executive agreements to be concluded 
between the US and “qualifying foreign governments”, doubts emerge as to the possibility for 
EU Member States to act bilaterally in a field where the Union has legislated extensively, both 
internally and externally. The Commission has already noted that bilateral agreements with 
non-EU countries would lead to “fragmentation” of the EU legal framework regulating access 
to data for law enforcement purposes.60 As recent research has shown, EU Member States are 
pre-empted from the conclusion of an international agreement with third countries on the 
exchange of personal data for law enforcement purposes, at least to the extent that such an 
agreement would undermine EU fundamental rights and rule of law standards (Carrera, et al., 
2018, p. 43). It is noteworthy that when the CLOUD Act was passed, the European 
Commissioner for Justice and Consumers Věra Jourova stressed that the measure “narrows the 
room for potential compatible solutions” between the EU and the US (Jourova, 2018). 
A fundamental problem of compatibility with EU law arises also with regard to the disparity in 
the guarantees that under any given CLOUD Act executive agreement would be granted, on the 
one hand, to “United States persons” and, on the other hand, to persons from the rest of the 
world – including EU citizens. In fact, the CLOUD Act establishes that US constitutional 
                                                     
58 See European Commission (2017a).  
59 Ibid., p. 9. 
60 European Commission (2018a), p. 78. 
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safeguards would continue to apply only to foreign requests for data targeting US citizens or 
aliens lawfully admitted (for permanent residence) to the country. No specific guarantee is 
provided by the CLOUD Act as to the level of protection granted to EU citizens’ data in the US, 
especially in the case where an executive agreement is signed between the US and a non-EU 
country. 
Safeguarding EU citizens against the risks that derive from divergences in the level and scope 
of fundamental rights protection granted respectively by the EU and the US legal systems has 
been a key point of controversy in previous transatlantic discussions on international data 
transfers, which eventually led to the adoption of the EU–US Umbrella Agreement.61 The main 
objective underlying the EU–US Umbrella Agreement is precisely to ensure adherence to EU 
data protection standards in transatlantic data transfers. These standards apply when personal 
data are exchanged for reasons relating to the prevention, investigation, detection and 
prosecution of criminal offences, and also cover transfer by private companies in the territory 
of one party to the competent authority of the other party. The Umbrella Agreement grants EU 
citizens the possibility to seek judicial remedies before US courts if US authorities mishandle 
their data. 
However, the EU–US Umbrella Agreement “in and of itself shall not be the legal basis for any 
transfers of personal information”, as it rather represents a “framework” for the protection of 
personal data that are exchanged between the US and EU Member States. In transatlantic 
relations, the basis for the exchange of evidence in criminal law matters is instead provided by 
the EU–US MLA Agreement.62 The latter provides for “collection of evidence by consent”, and 
is designed to embody “a carefully negotiated balance” between not only the interests, but also 
the obligations of different states.  
According to current criticisms, the most prominent practical issue that affects the EU–US MLA 
Agreement lies in the delays that are experienced in the execution of MLA requests (Daskal, 
2016). If smoothing cooperation under the EU–US MLA Agreement is essential to improve the 
fight against crime, previous research has shown how some of the delays faced by competent 
authorities in the attempt to obtain electronic information through the implementation of MLA 
procedures could be addressed through practical measures. These include for example the 
deployment of specialised personnel (e.g. national contact points and liaison magistrates) to 
promote reciprocal understanding of the legal systems involved and smooth cooperation 
among the different jurisdictions concerned; the streamlining of processes for requesting and 
providing assistance; and the allocation of sufficient financial and human resources to 
appropriately follow up the MLA requests. 
                                                     
61 Agreement between the United States of America and the European Union on the protection of personal 
information relating to the prevention, investigation, detection, and prosecution of criminal offences, OJ L 336/3, 
10.12.2016. 
62 Agreement of 25 June 2003 on mutual legal assistance between the European Union and the United States of 
America, OJ L 181, 19.7.2003, pp. 34-42. 
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To stand the test of legality under EU law, any further initiative between the EU and the US 
would need to take into account the benchmarks of judicial cooperation provided under the 
MLA system. Exercising reciprocal judicial scrutiny over incoming LEA requests for data emerges 
in particular as an essential requirement under EU law. 
On the one hand, such scrutiny enables the protection of the subject whose data fall under EU 
law, as confirmed by the fact that under the EU–US MLA Agreement requests issued by US 
authorities directed at obtaining data stored in the EU by non-US companies have been refused 
on grounds such as the absence of dual criminality, a failure to demonstrate a nexus between 
the evidence sought and the criminal conducted alleged, and on the basis of essential 
interests.63 On the other hand, it serves the purpose of ensuring that EU citizens’ fundamental 
rights are appropriately guaranteed in the US.  
3.2. The European Investigation Order 
May 2017 marked the entry into force of the Directive on the European Investigation Order in 
criminal matters. The proposal for the directive was tabled in April 2010 by a group of eight 
Member States.64 Except for Denmark65 and Ireland,66 all the EU Member States currently 
participate in the EIO Directive. All participating EU countries have by now transposed this piece 
of EU law in their national legislation, although in some cases (e.g. Austria, Luxembourg and 
Spain) transposition only occurred in the second half of 2018.67 
Even before transposition, the EIO was already considered ‘inefficient’. In this regard, it is 
interesting to note that a joint Europol and Eurojust paper presented to the Council in March 
2017 anticipated that “the EIO framework may not accommodate (…) the speed that is required 
to capture electronic evidence. Moreover, the Directive does not contain provisions that 
specifically facilitate the collection of common types of electronic evidence, meaning that 
additional tools need to be developed to facilitate the collection of electronic evidence under 
the EIO framework.”68 If it is true that EIO legislation does not expressly mention “electronic 
evidence” as such, Article 13 of the EIO Directive nonetheless refers to ‘data’. This indicates 
that evidence may indeed be gathered and exchanged in electronic form through the EIO. At 
the same time, and similar to MLAs, the EIO set forth standards that must be met if electronic 
data collected as part of a criminal investigation are to qualify as evidence accepted as 
‘admissible’ before a court of law. 
                                                     
63 Council of the European Union (2016a). 
64 These were Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Estonia, Luxembourg, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden. 
65 Denmark exercised a general opt-out from all EU justice and home affairs measures – see Protocol 22 attached 
to the Treaties. 
66 Ireland still has the possibility to opt into the EIO Directive by virtue of Protocol 21 attached to the Treaties. 
67 European Judicial Network (2018).  
68 See Eurojust and Europol (2017).  
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The EIO Directive creates a “single, efficient and flexible instrument”69 to be used for the 
execution of cross-border investigative measures, including those involving the gathering of 
electronic data in the territory of other Member States. This new tool replaces previous 
instruments for criminal justice cooperation regulating the exchange of evidence through 
mutual legal assistance. It aims at reducing the uncertainty related to the fragmentation of the 
pre-existing framework of cooperation.70 Outside the EIO, EU Member States’ formal 
cooperation for the gathering of information (including electronic data) in the framework of 
criminal proceedings is still governed through MLATs. The EIO Directive foresees that Member 
States may conclude or continue to apply bilateral or multilateral agreements or arrangements 
with other Member States only to the extent that these “make it possible to strengthen the 
aims” of the EIO.71 These aims consist of simplifying and facilitating the procedures for 
gathering evidence in full compliance with EU law safeguards.  
The EIO Directive responded, in the first place, to the goal of facilitating cross-border criminal 
investigations by extending the principle of mutual recognition to the field of evidence 
gathering in criminal proceedings. In practice, the EIO consists of a judicial decision that a 
competent authority of a Member State issues or validates in order to have one or several 
specific investigative measures carried out in another Member State (see Figure 2). 
Figure 2. Execution of an EIO 
 
Sources: Authors’ elaboration.  
                                                     
69 Council of the European Union (2016b), p. 2.  
70 The framework included the 1959 Council of Europe Convention, ratified by all of the EU Member States; the 
Benelux Treaty of 1962; the Convention for the application of the Schengen agreements of 1990; the Convention 
Implementing the Schengen Agreement; and the 2000 EU MLA Convention, with its Protocol of 2001. Some 
provisions related to the gathering of evidence for criminal proceedings were also introduced through the 
Framework Decisions 2003/577/JHA on freezing property or evidence and 2008/978/JHA on a European Evidence 
Warrant. 
71 Article 34(3) of the EIO Directive. 
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The instrument was chiefly designed to speed up the procedure for transmitting requests 
involving investigative actions across borders and to reduce the possible grounds of refusal by 
limiting the degree of discretion that, under the MLA system, is left to the authorities required 
to execute foreign investigative measures (Bachmaier Winter, 2010).  
The EIO Directive exempts the executing authority from assessing double criminality, as it 
provides for the execution of the EIO if it relates to an offence that is punishable in the issuing 
Member State by a custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at least 
three years and falls within one of the 32 categories of offences listed in Annex D of the 
Directive.72 The EIO should be executed within the strict time limits provided in the Directive.73 
In this regard, the Directive specifies that the competent authorities of the Member State 
receiving an EIO will have a maximum period of 30 days to decide to recognise and execute the 
request, and 90 days to execute the request effectively. The Directive also allows for a shorter 
deadline when required by the seriousness of the offence or in other particularly urgent 
circumstances, and this should be taken into account as much as possible when processing the 
order.74 Article 32(2) of the Directive provides for a 24-hour deadline for provisional measures, 
such as the preservation of data. This provision can thus be used in urgent cases. Furthermore, 
the executing authorities should take a final decision on the execution of the EIO and carry out 
the required investigative measure(s) with the “same celerity and priority as for a similar 
domestic case”.75  
The EIO Directive contributes to enhancing judicial cooperation in the field of evidence 
gathering also by providing for the execution of a wide range of investigative measures. EIOs 
are not limited to the preservation (freezing) phase, and go beyond the objective of preventing 
the destruction, transformation, movement, transfer or disposal of existing evidence. In fact, 
the Directive allows Member States to issue an order for the executing country to conduct new 
investigative measures directed at obtaining and transferring information – including electronic 
data – previously unavailable to the competent authorities, with minimum formality.76 Such 
investigative measures might also cover the “collection of traffic and location data associated 
with telecommunications, allowing competent authorities to issue an EIO for the purpose of 
obtaining less intrusive data on telecommunications”.77 
Besides introducing a demand-based system for conducting cross-border investigative 
measures based on swift procedures and minimum formalities, the EIO also sets 
                                                     
72 Article 11(1)(g) of the EIO Directive. This list replicates Article 2(2) of the Framework Decision on the European 
Arrest Warrant. There is no express political offence exception; however, see recital 39. 
73 Article 12(3)–(5) of the EIO Directive).  
74 Ibid., Article 12(2-4). 
75 Ibid., Article 12(1).  
76 By contrast, a freezing order issued under Framework Decision 2003/577/JHA on freezing property or evidence 
was required to be accompanied by a separate request for the transfer of evidence to the state issuing the order 
in accordance with the rules applicable to mutual assistance in criminal proceedings. 
77 Recital 11 of the EIO Directive. 
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unprecedented ‘benchmarks’ for EU judicial cooperation in criminal matters with the objective 
of guaranteeing a set of supranational safeguards in complying with the legal and constitutional 
system of the executing Member State (Carrera et al., 2016). 
In the first place, the issuing of an EIO is only possible in relation to acts or facts that are 
punishable under the national law of the issuing country,78 and when the judicial decision of 
the issuing Member State may give rise to proceedings before a court having jurisdiction in 
criminal matters.79 These provisions aim at preventing Member States from employing the EIO 
to obtain evidence abroad that they are not able to obtain under their own domestic legal and 
constitutional procedures, and at ensuring that these cross-border investigative measures are 
not used for police-to-police cooperation per se. The deployment of the EIO is specifically 
directed at the collection of information related to facts that constitute a criminal offence 
worthy of review in a judicial proceeding.  
Judicial authorities are centrally involved during both the issuing and executing phases of the 
EIO. The EIO Directive clearly stipulates that any decision to issue an EIO taken by an authority 
other than a judge, court, investigating magistrate or public prosecutor must be validated by 
one of those bodies (Glaser et al., 2010). Furthermore, the executing authority must comply 
with the formalities and procedures expressly indicated by the issuing authority only to the 
extent that these are not contrary to the fundamental principles of law of the executing state. 
This assessment entails judicial scrutiny by the competent authority of the executing state with 
regard to the legality, necessity and proportionality of the investigative measures requested 
through the EIO. 
This judicial scrutiny might lead the executing authority to refuse to recognise and execute an 
EIO, for instance for certain categories of (less serious) offences for which the requirement of 
dual criminality has not been met, or when the execution of the investigative measure 
requested under the EIO would not be authorised under the law of the executing state in a 
similar domestic case (Heard and Mansell, 2014). Consistent with this proportionality 
requirement, the EIO Directive allows the executing authority to have recourse to an 
investigative measure other than that indicated in the EIO, “where the investigative measure 
selected by the executing authority would achieve the same result by less intrusive means than 
the investigative measure indicated in the EIO”.80 In substance, the EIO Directive aims at 
increasing mutual trust and cooperation between competent judicial authorities of EU Member 
States, while at the same time preserving the specificities of the national systems and their legal 
culture. 
                                                     
78 See Article 6(1)(b) of the EIO Directive. This provision has been included to avoid instances where Member 
States use the EIO to ‘fish’ for evidence. 
79 Article 4 of the EIO Directive.  
80 Article 10(3) of the EIO Directive.  
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This piece of EU legislation also requires judicial authorities to verify whether the execution of 
an EIO is compliant with fundamental rights standards.81 The EIO Directive reiterates the limits 
to the mutual recognition principle in the preamble:  
if there are substantial grounds for believing that the execution of an investigative 
measure indicated in the EIO would result in a breach of a fundamental right of the 
person concerned, and that the executing State would disregard its obligations 
concerning the protection of fundamental rights recognised in the Charter, the 
execution of the EIO should be refused.82  
Judicial actors are called upon to verify whether specific grounds of legitimate refusal to 
recognise and execute an EIO exist. These grounds are quite specific and include cases where 
the execution of an EIO could lead to a breach of rules on immunity or privilege, or rules limiting 
criminal liability relating to freedom of the press, or where it could harm essential national 
security interests, or infringe the ne bis in idem principle.83 The wording of the Directive seems 
to suggest that a defect in this regard by another Member State should be judged in individual 
cases (De Capitani and Peers, 2014). National legal traditions are also safeguarded by provisions 
establishing that the executing authorities may refuse the execution of an EIO when “the use 
of the investigative measure indicated in the EIO is restricted under the law of the executing 
state to a list or category of offences or to offences punishable by a certain threshold, which 
does not include the offence covered by the EIO”.84  
In cases where a claim is made that the issuance or execution of an EIO would lead to a breach 
of individual rights, the EIO Directive requires that “remedies equivalent to those available in a 
similar domestic case” are made available against the investigative measures adopted under 
the EIO.85 It also includes provisions ensuring that information about remedies is provided, that 
time limits for doing so are reasonable and that the rights of the defence are considered. 
However, challenges to the substantive reasons for issuing an EIO are solely possible before the 
authorities of the issuing country (Heard and Mansell, 2014). 
In addition, the EIO Directive provides that the suspected or accused person, or the lawyer on 
his/her behalf, may require the issuing of an EIO, “within the framework of applicable rights of 
the defence in conformity with national criminal procedure”.86 Moreover, the defendant can 
be confident that, once the foreign authorities will have received the EIO, they will be under 
considerable pressure to execute it, as it is an order coming from another EU judicial authority 
rather than an ordinary MLA request (Carrera et al., 2018, p. 80). Once the EIO is executed, the 
                                                     
81 Ibid., Article 11(1)(f). 
82 Ibid., Recital 19.  
83 Ibid., Article 11. 
84 Ibid., Article 11(1)(h).  
85 Ibid., Article 14. 
86 Ibid., Article 1(3).  
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executing authority should, without undue delay, transfer the evidence obtained or already in 
its possession to the issuing state. 
Finally, the Directive makes explicit reference to the first three post-Lisbon measures dealing 
with procedural guarantees for criminal suspects, namely: Directive 2010/64/EU on the right 
to interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings; Directive 2012/13/EU on the right to 
information in criminal proceedings; and Directive 2013/48/EU on the right of access to a 
lawyer and the right to communicate when deprived of liberty. These references can be read 
as a requirement to interpret and implement the post-Lisbon EU criminal justice acquis in a 
consistent manner. 
4. The European Commission’s e-evidence proposals 
In April 2018, the European Commission tabled two legislative proposals on the gathering of 
electronic evidence in criminal matters. Both proposals respond to the goal of equipping LEAs 
with binding instruments that, if adopted, could be used to directly address private companies 
across borders and compel them to secure and provide electronic information sought for a 
criminal proceeding.  
The first is a proposal for a regulation foreseeing the introduction of two new crime-fighting 
tools, namely the European Production and Preservation Orders. The European Production 
Order consists of a mandatory request that Member State LEAs could issue to obtain a piece of 
electronic information directly from a company in another Member State. The European 
Preservation Order would instead impose upon service providers outside the issuing Member 
State the obligation to preserve stored data in view of a subsequent request to produce such 
data. The subsequent request to obtain the preserved data could originate from the Member 
State issuing the Preservation Order, but also from another Member State conducting a 
criminal investigation or a third country.  
The second consists of a proposal for a directive that would introduce an obligation for private 
companies – including communications service providers, social networks, online marketplaces 
and all providers of internet infrastructures (e.g. internet protocol (IP) addresses and domain 
name registries) – in the EU to appoint at least one legal representative to act as a point of 
contact for Production and Preservation Orders addressed by LEAs. 
The proposal covers companies and service providers operating in one or more Member States, 
wherever their headquarters are located or the information sought is stored. The legal 
representative would be responsible – on behalf of the company – for “receiving, complying 
with and enforcing”87 the European Production and Preservation Orders proposed under the 
new e-evidence regulation. As shown in Table 1, the personal scope of the Commission’s 
proposals is broader than that of the CLOUD Act, which only concerns US companies. 
                                                     
87 See European Commission (2018d), p. 4. 
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Table 1. Personal scope (e-evidence proposals and the CLOUD Act) 
Service providers concerned 
E-evidence proposals CLOUD Act 
All digital service providers, including 
 electronic communications (covering 
telecommunication) service providers; 
 information society service providers; 
and 
 providers of internet infrastructure 
services and marketplaces. 
US companies, including 
 electronic communications service 
providers (such as email providers); and  
 remote computing service providers 
(including certain cloud storage providers). 
They fall under the scope of the e-evidence 
proposals as long as they offer services in the EU 
market, even if 
 the data are stored abroad (e.g. in the 
US); 
 the main site of the company is not 
established in the EU; and 
 the service is provided from abroad. 
They fall under the scope of the CLOUD Act if their 
main site is in the US, when: 
 
 the data (including contents of a wire or 
electronic communication and any record or 
other information pertaining to a customer or 
subscriber within the provider’s possession) is 
stored in the US; 
 the data are stored abroad (e.g. in the EU). 
Note: The indicators used to ascertain whether a service is provided in the EU market include availability of the service in an 
EU Member State language that is not widely spoken outside the EU and the possibility to pay in euros. The mere accessibility 
of the service from the EU is not considered sufficient.  
Sources: Authors’ elaboration based on European Commission (2018a), p. 52, and CLOUD Act, Sec. 103, para. 2713.  
In terms of material scope, the scope of the Commission’s proposals encompasses different 
categories of electronic information, mainly distinguished between content data (e.g. text, 
voice, videos, images and sounds stored in a digital format) and non-content data (including 
subscriber data, metadata, access logs and transaction logs).88  
4.1. Background of the proposals 
As requests to access and gather electronic information have become a common criminal 
investigative practice at the national, regional and international levels, policy and legislative 
efforts have increasingly sought to find alternatives to both the system of voluntary nature of 
current service provider’s cooperation with LEAs, and the ‘mediated’ model of cross-border 
cooperation for access to data provided by the EIO and MLATs. 
At the EU level, discussions on the need to create a tool facilitating access to electronic data for 
cross-border criminal proceedings started in 2015 when the Commission presented the 
                                                     
88 See the glossary in this report. 
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European Agenda on Security89 and they advanced in parallel with other (different) initiatives 
put forward under the so-called Security Union strategy.90 The European Council and the 
Council of the European Union have been particularly supportive of the Commission’s work to 
facilitate the gathering of electronic data sought by Member State authorities involved in 
criminal proceedings. In its Conclusions on “improving criminal justice in cyberspace”, adopted 
in June 2016, the Council stressed the need for EU action in this respect.91 
Based on consultations with stakeholders conducted as part of the expert process launched 
after the June 2016 Council Conclusions, the Commission presented a non-paper that identified 
several options for improving access to electronic information for crime-fighting purposes.92 
These options varied in nature and objectives, and aimed at tackling issues related to the 
different instruments available for investigating and prosecuting authorities to obtain data from 
service providers, both within the EU and in cooperation with the US. 
A first set of options consisted of “practical measures” to improve cooperation among law 
enforcement and judicial actors, and their interactions with companies holding the data.93 
These consisted of non-legislative actions relying on the framework of cooperation already 
provided under the existing EU and international legal instruments (i.e. the EIO and MLATs). 
They included the idea to create an electronic (and user-friendly) version of the EIO, and the 
establishment of a platform (using the e-CODEX system) for fostering digital exchanges and 
replies between EU judicial authorities. Among the considered measures there was also the 
possibility to create single points of contact to ease and streamline cooperation between public 
authorities and service providers. According to the Commission, these measures could address 
inefficiencies in public–private cooperation, specifically by reducing delays in responses.94  
Other solutions proposed consisted of soft-law measures aimed at improving cooperation 
between Member States and US judicial and diplomatic authorities through the organisation of 
technical dialogues, training, and exchange of information and best practices on applicable 
rules and procedures related to the issuing and treatment of MLA requests in a transatlantic 
context. As for direct cooperation with service providers for access to non-content data, the 
main suggestions for improvement consisted of streamlining companies’ policies and practices, 
as well as the standardisation and reduction of forms used in Member States to facilitate the 
creation of “quality requests”.95  
While acknowledging the potential of these practical measures to improve cooperation among 
judicial authorities and between the latter and private companies, the Justice and Home Affairs 
                                                     
89 The document stressed the need for eliminating any “obstacles to criminal investigation of cybercrime”, 
including those deriving from existing rules on access to electronic data. See European Commission (2015). 
90 See European Commission (2018e).  
91 Council of the European Union (2016b).  
92 European Commission (2017b).  
93 Ibid., p. 2. 
94 European Commission (2018a), p. 46. 
95 Ibid., p. 47. 
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Council of June 2017 highlighted how a “large majority” of Member State ministers supported 
the need to consider EU legislative action to enable LEAs to access data through direct 
cooperation with service providers.96 As noted in the report on the outcome of the Justice and 
Home Affairs Council meeting of June 2017, in view of the “sense of urgency” raised by a 
number of ministers with regard to EU legislative action on “e-evidence”, the Commission 
announced its intention to present a legislative proposal in early 2018.97  
4.2. The e-evidence proposals in light of EU primary and secondary law standards 
4.2.1. The right legal basis? Criminal justice vs police cooperation 
The impact assessment accompanying the e-evidence proposals qualifies the European 
Production and Preservation Orders as judicial cooperation instruments designed to bring into 
being a “new dimension in mutual recognition”. Consequently, the Commission has chosen 
Article 82 TFEU as a legal basis for the proposed regulation on European Production and 
Preservation Orders for electronic evidence in criminal matters.  
The argument advanced to justify the Commission’s choice of this specific legal basis is that 
Article 82(1)(d) TFEU envisages the possibility to adopt criminal justice measures directed not 
only at “facilitating” cooperation between judicial or equivalent authorities of the Member 
States, but also at “enforcing” decisions taken by these authorities in relation to proceedings in 
criminal matters (Ligeti and Robinson, 2017, p. 111). Yet, it seems questionable that the 
execution of a Member State authority’s decision to access personal data by a private company 
can be qualified as judicial cooperation, especially in a context where the role left to judicial 
authorities in the operationalisation of the proposed instruments remains overall limited. 
According to the Commission’s proposal, judicial authorisation in the issuing country would be 
required, but only when a Production Order concerns the production or preservation of specific 
types of (i.e. transactional or content) data. Judicial scrutiny would not be required as far as 
non-content data, and notably subscriber and access data, are concerned. Indeed, it is 
proposed that disclosure of the latter types of information could be ordered directly by 
prosecutors.98 The same applies to European Preservation Orders which, it seems, could also 
be issued by a prosecutor (i.e. without independent judicial validation), and regardless of the 
types of data concerned.99 Nor does the proposed regulation foresee the systematic 
involvement of the competent judicial authorities of the Member State where the data, or the 
                                                     
96 Many ministers, however, underlined that in developing such a framework, due account must be taken of the 
issues of data protection. 
97 Council of the European Union (2017).  
98 See Article 4 of the proposed Regulation; see also the proposed Regulation Explanatory Memorandum, p. 16. 
99 As indicated by the Commission in the proposed Regulation Explanatory Memorandum, “to enable investigating 
authorities to act fast and given that the relevant request to produce the data will be the subsequent request 
where all the conditions will again be scrutinised, European Preservation Orders may also be issued or validated 
by a prosecutor”, p. 17. 
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company holding it, are located. Judicial actors of this EU country would only eventually and 
accidentally be involved in the process, in cases where the service providers decide not to 
execute the order served upon them based on pre-defined grounds of “non-compliance” (see 
Figure 3 below). 
The Commission claims that the ‘orders’ would introduce a ‘new model’ of direct private–public 
cooperation in criminal matters that ‘builds upon’ the principle of mutual recognition.100 This 
interpretation appears difficult to square with the scope of Article 82(1) TFEU as well as of 
Article 67(3) TFEU, which circumscribe the application of mutual recognition instruments to 
cooperation between competent Member State authorities. In fact, it is among the latter that 
a relationship based on reciprocal trust is established under EU law – there is no general 
assumption of reciprocal trust between public authorities and private companies. Under 
existing mutual recognition instruments decisions need to come from a judicial (or equivalent) 
authority in the issuing state and their execution requires the prior involvement of a judicial 
authority in the Member State where the addressee or the object concerned by the measure 
is located.  
The question seems very much one of checks and balances within the EU criminal justice 
system. EU primary law calls for the prosecutor’s actions affecting fundamental rights (like the 
search of personal information) to remain under the control of independent judges. In the 
Explanatory Memorandum to the e-evidence proposal the Commission recognises that the use 
of the proposed instruments could potentially affect a number of fundamental rights, including 
the right to protection of personal data, the right to respect of private and family life, the right 
to freedom of expression, the right of defence, the right to an effective remedy and to a fair 
trial. However, the proposed regulation offers no guarantees that independent judicial scrutiny 
will be ensured automatically and systematically in the issuing country, nor in the country 
where the addressee is located. 
In light of the consolidated CJEU jurisprudence on the operationalisation of the mutual 
recognition principle in criminal matters, it cannot be assumed that the prior involvement of a 
judicial authority in the Member State issuing the orders alone is sufficient to ensure that the 
person concerned by a criminal measure is not exposed to the risks of fundamental rights 
violations (see section 2.2. above). As noted by the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission, in 
some countries “a ‘prosecutorial bias’ seems to lead to a quasi-automatic approval of all such 
requests from the prosecutors. This is a danger not only for the human rights of the persons 
concerned but for the independence of the judiciary as a whole.”101 Nevertheless, under the 
proposed regulation the judicial authorities of the state to which the order is addressed would 
have no opportunity to make their own assessment when the service providers directly comply 
with a European Production or Preservation Order issued by another EU country (see 
subsection 4.2.3 below).  
                                                     
100 European Commission (2018a). 
101 European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) (2011), p. 14 (emphasis added). 
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Rather than facilitating the mutual recognition of judicial decisions within the Union, the 
proposed regulation appears to mainly be directed at enabling law enforcement actors, and in 
particular police and prosecutors, to request, access, collect and share data held by companies 
across borders and sought during the pre-trial or trial phase of a criminal proceeding. The 
achievement of this goal will depend on the establishment of a framework of cooperation 
under which service providers receive, assess and respond directly to a foreign law 
enforcement order to produce or preserve data. Based on the above, it is worth asking whether 
Article 82(2)(a) TFEU (police cooperation among the Member States in criminal matters) would 
better reflect both the main aim and content of the e-evidence proposals. 
In this regard, it is important to remember that under EU law the choice of legal basis for any 
EU action must be supported by objective factors, “amenable to judicial review”.102 The 
distinction operated in the EU Treaties between judicial cooperation in criminal matters (where 
independent judges are central figures and monitor trust), and police cooperation (where LEAs, 
including prosecutors, carry out law enforcement investigations for the purpose of fighting 
crime) is central in this respect, and must be reflected in the legal basis selected for specific EU 
instruments. 
As clearly stressed by the CJEU, “if an examination of an act of the Union reveals that it pursues 
a twofold aim, or that it has a twofold component, and if one of those is identifiable as the main 
one, and the other is merely incidental, the measure must be based on a single legal basis, 
namely that required by the main aim or component”.103 In any case, when an EU measure 
“simultaneously pursues a number of objectives or has several components that are 
indissociably linked, without one being secondary and indirect in relation to the other, such an 
act will have to be founded on the various corresponding legal bases”.104 
It is also concerning to note that any reference to Article 16(2) TFEU (respect of personal data) 
is currently missing from the Commission’s proposals. Any EU measure seeking to counter 
terrorism and crime must in fact go hand in hand with data protection safeguards. As a 
consequence, it appears that an instrument aimed at enabling data collection in a law 
enforcement context cannot but also encompass this EU primary law provision. In its recent 
Opinion on the proposals on European Production and Preservation Orders for electronic 
evidence in criminal matters, the European Data Protection Board also has questioned the 
Commission’s choice of legal Basis (EDPB 2018, p. 4). 
Doubts have also been expressed with regard to whether the selected legal basis suffices to 
adopt Article 13 of the draft regulation, which obliges the Member States to provide for 
pecuniary sanctions for violations of the obligations under Articles 9–11. The potential 
                                                     
102 Opinion 1/15, para. 55. 
103 Case C-178/03 Commission of the European Communities v European Parliament and Council of the European 
Union [ECLI:EU:C:2006:4], para. 42 (emphasis added). 
104 Ibid., para. 43 (emphasis added). 
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harmonising effect of this provision on the substantive criminal laws of the Member States may 
require an additional legal basis (Meijers Committee, 2018). 
4.2.2. Concerns over necessity, legality and proportionality 
The proposed regulation is said to have a limited scope.105 In that regard, its draft Article 5 
proposes to only allow the issuing of European Production Orders for transactional and content 
data when the underlying offence is capable of attracting a custodial sentence of three years 
or more, or when the underlying offence falls under one of the definitions adopted under EU 
instruments regarding money counterfeiting, child sexual abuse, cybercrime and terrorism. By 
contrast, Production Orders targeting subscriber data and access data may be issued for any 
criminal offence.106 A series of doubts arise with regard to the compatibility of these provisions 
with the principles of necessity, legality and proportionality. 
In the first place, limiting the application of a European Production Order to criminal offences 
punishable by custodial sentences of at least three years can hardly be qualified as a real 
limitation. Under the penal codes of the Member States, a very large number of offences fall 
under this category, including offences that are not considered to constitute a serious crime. 
In this regard, it is important to recall that other international cooperation mechanisms (e.g. 
the UN) set higher thresholds.  
Furthermore, Article 5 refers to definitions of crime adopted at the EU level in areas in which 
Member States are allowed to provide for broader definitions of crime at the national level. In 
any case, to date the concept of “serious crime” has not been defined by EU law, and the 
circumstances that allow law enforcement actors to order service providers to produce data 
still depend on specific national legislation and vary by Member State.107 
Somehow contradicting the view according to which the scope of the proposed regulation is 
limited, the Commission has stressed that the initiative is not limited to serious crime, as “the 
problem of cross-border access to e-evidence in criminal investigations is relevant for all 
crimes”.108 The absence of a precise vision and definition of which crimes are actually covered 
by the proposal is particularly problematic, especially in a context where there is no 
involvement of a second-line check of legality, necessity and proportionality by judicial 
authorities in the Member State where the order is addressed.  
The CJEU has traditionally limited the possibility to retain and collect both traffic and location 
data for law enforcement purposes when this is necessary for the prosecution of individuals 
suspected of having committed a serious crime. In the Ministerio Fiscal judgment, the CJEU 
recognised that legitimate derogations to the principle of confidentiality of electronic 
                                                     
105 See pp. 5-6 of the draft regulation Explanatory Memorandum 
106 Article 5(3) of the proposed Regulation. 
107 Case C-207/16 Ministerio Fiscal [ECLI:EU:C:2018:788], para. 95 and following. 
108 See European Commission (2018a), p. 44.  
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communications are not strictly limited to the fight against serious crime, but can be admitted 
also, if they constitute non-serious interferences,109  when it is necessary for the investigation 
and prosecution of other (non-serious) ‘criminal offences’. The case, nevertheless, did not 
concern a request to access traffic and location data but only the phone numbers linked to 
specific SIM cards, and data about the identity of their owners, during a very limited period of 
time. 
In any case, the Court also restated in that judgment that access by public authorities to 
personal data retained by service providers constitutes an interference with the fundamental 
rights of privacy and data protection, without it being relevant that the information in question 
is sensitive or whether the persons concerned have been inconvenienced in any way. In 
substance, data accesses that are necessary for the fight against non-serious crime must also 
always be proportionate in light of their impact on fundamental rights provided under the EU 
Charter.  
Ensuring the proportionality of data gathering in criminal prosecution under the new regulation 
would become particularly difficult also because independent judicial validation is not 
systematically guaranteed in the issuing country, nor in the country where an order is to be 
executed, for all instances of data transfer. Judicial scrutiny is not required as far as the 
production of non-content data, and notably subscriber and access data, are concerned. It is in 
fact proposed that disclosure of the latter types of information can be ordered directly by 
prosecutors.110 Moreover, orders to produce those types of personal information can be issued 
for any criminal offence. European Preservation Orders can also be issued without independent 
judicial validation, and regardless of the type of data concerned. 
Table 2. Standards applying to the issuing of Production Orders 
Type of data Threshold Issuing authority 
Subscriber data Any criminal offence Judicial authority or 
prosecutor 
Access data Any criminal offence Judicial authority or 
prosecutor 
Transactional Offences carrying a maximum custodial 
sentence of 3 years or more (or 
catalogued offences) 
Judicial authority 
Content Offences carrying a maximum custodial 
sentence of 3 years or more (or 
catalogued offences) 
Judicial authority 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on the proposed Regulation. 
                                                     
109 Ministerio Fiscal, para. 61. 
110 See Article 4 of the proposed regulation; see also the proposed regulation Explanatory Memorandum, p. 16. 
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At the same time, as the impact assessment to the Commission proposal shows, most of the 
cross-border requests for access to data are currently directed at obtaining non-content 
information.111 If passed in its current form, the Commission proposal could lead to an 
unprecedented increase in volumes of data requests in criminal investigations. The European 
Commission states that investigators seek electronic evidence in “around 85% of criminal 
investigations”, and that over half of those law enforcement investigations “involve a cross-
border request to access electronic evidence”.  
The risk is legalising ‘fishing expeditions’ whereby investigators order service providers to 
produce or preserve large troves of non-content data in the hope that the information they 
receive will bear out assumptions made during early stages of the criminal investigations, and 
simultaneously collect data which are not directly related to the criminal offence for which the 
investigative measure was adopted. Without judicial validation by an independent judge, it will 
become extremely difficult to ensure that the requested information is restricted to what is 
relevant and necessary for the prosecution of a crime. Additionally, the proposal in its current 
shape does not foresee a general obligation for public authorities issuing the order to reimburse 
the service providers for the cost incurred in executing the order. Such a provision could 
potentially act as a deterrent to avoid the automatic issuing of orders in all criminal 
investigations. However, the proposed regulation leaves it to the single Member State to decide 
whether (and in which cases) to refund service providers for the costs incurred in processing 
the orders.  
When used to obtain content data, the new instruments could mean increasing the 
administrative burden in national judicial systems, with judges being potentially exposed to a 
large number of ‘orders’ to be reviewed. Furthermore, it is not clear how the high volumes of 
‘raw’ data obtained will be dealt with, or to what extent they will actually be admitted as 
‘evidence’ in criminal proceedings. In fact, the proposed regulation establishes that data should 
be provided regardless of whether the service provider is able to decrypt the information or 
disclose it in an encrypted form only. It is not clear whether the authorities receiving the 
encrypted data will have the necessary technical capacity and resources to make them usable 
for the scope of the proceedings. Still, to ensure the necessity and proportionality of the 
proposal it is necessary to assess precisely in which cases the execution of a Production Order 
would lead to the collection of data that can produce probatory material before a criminal 
court. There is a risk that the data collected will never be presented in court, upon which shall 
thus not be fully entrusted the judicial review of the measures at stake. 
Under existing mutual recognition instruments, and namely the EIO, the scrutiny conducted by 
judicial authorities in the phase that precedes the execution of cross-border criminal justice 
measures also serves the purpose of ensuring that immunities and privileges protecting the 
data sought in the Member States of the company are adequately taken into account. Under 
the proposed regulation, it would instead be for the authorities of the issuing state to verify the 
                                                     
111 See European Commission (2018a), p. 14. 
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existence of potential immunities or privileges.112 This would not be an easy task, as it would 
presume that the issuing authorities possess an in-depth knowledge of specific provisions 
related to accessing electronic data for criminal justice purposes, as regulated in the other 26 
Member States’ legal systems.  
4.2.3. Issues arising from the execution, review and enforcement of the proposed orders 
In the Commission’s proposals, the exclusion of the execution state’s judicial authorities during 
the phase that precedes the actual execution of the order is to be compensated by the 
involvement of the private companies (or their legal representatives) upon which such a 
measure is served.113 It would thus become the latter’s responsibility to verify the subsistence 
of grounds justifying the refusal to execute a Production or Preservation Order. This new role 
that the draft regulation assigns to private companies is highly problematic, for a number of 
reasons.  
The proposal seems to impose upon private companies a general obligation to comply with the 
certificate transmitting the orders (i.e. the European Production Certificate (EPOC), or the 
European Preservation Order Certificate (EPOC-PR)).114 This is confirmed by the introduction of 
financial penalties, especially foreseen to incentivise companies to produce or preserve the 
data sought by prosecuting authorities in cross-border criminal investigations.115 True, the 
proposed regulation also allows service providers to object to the automatic execution of the 
proposed orders. However, the only legitimate grounds for raising exceptions are substantially 
limited to cases where the certificate transmitting the order is incomplete, manifestly incorrect 
or the data requested have been (lawfully) deleted or are not in the possession of the 
addressees.116 Outside these cases, any ISP or company refusal to execute the order is 
automatically considered a case of “non-compliance”. 
                                                     
112 Article 5 of the proposed Regulation.  
113 Ibid., Article 7. 
114 Ibid., Articles 9 and 10.  
115 Ibid., Article 13. 
116 Ibid., Article 9. 
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Figure 3. Execution and enforcement of the proposed orders 
 
Note: EPO = European Production/Preservation Order. 
Source: Authors elaboration 
For each case (or hypothesis) of non-compliance contemplated by the proposed regulation, a 
specific type of enforcement procedure would follow, as shown in Figure 3 above. 
Non-compliance based on fundamental rights considerations  
The first hypothesis of “non-compliance” envisaged by the proposed regulation encompasses 
situations where the service provider refuses to execute the order because it is “apparent” that 
granting access to the requested data would result in a “manifest” violation of the EU Charter 
of fundamental rights, or that the order is “manifestly abusive”. It is important to note these 
notions do not have definitions in EU law. Fundamental rights risks for the persons concerned 
by the execution of an order can exist and be relevant even when they are not manifest. The 
choice to leave private companies with the responsibility to decide when not to execute (and 
therefore contravene) the order on the basis of vague fundamental rights considerations does 
not seem to offer the targeted persons (i.e. suspects in criminal investigation, and more in 
general all the subjects whose data are affected by Production or Preservation Orders) with 
effective guarantees against potential abuses. 
In fact, the decision not to comply can only be based on a prima facie fundamental rights 
assessment to be conducted within a very limited timeframe (ranging from 10 days to a 
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minimum of 6 hours).117 Furthermore, the proposal does not require the issuing authority to 
indicate ex ante (i.e. in the certificates) important information related to the grounds of 
necessity and proportionality of the order, nor to include “further details” about the case. The 
scarcity of information made available constitutes another obstacle to the possibility for the 
service providers to properly assess the fundamental rights impact of the measure.118 
More in general, it appears unrealistic to expect that private companies will effectively engage 
in this type of sensitive and complex legal assessments, and assume upon themselves the duty 
to protect fundamental rights. This responsibility is simply not part of the statutory goals of 
private organisations that pursue exclusively commercial interests. In this regard, it is 
concerning to note that whereas the proposal sets out financial penalties to ensure service 
providers comply with the orders served on them, it excludes any responsibility for human 
rights violations deriving from the production of the data, if the company acted in “good 
faith”.119 Discharging private companies from human rights responsibilities that might stem 
from their decision to execute a Production Order appears, however, to be at odds with the 
principles of corporate social responsibility emerging under international and EU law.120 
The very rationale underlying the different provisions on the role of service providers does not, 
as a matter of fact, appear to be concerned with effectively replacing judicial authorities in 
terms of rule of law requirements, but rather with facilitating their intervention, and mitigating 
some possible conflicts. If this can be described as concerning a ‘protective function’ (Böse, p. 
41), the protection here at stake is not the protection of fundamental rights, but the protection 
of the interests of service providers – which might of course be legitimate, but are not the only 
interests endangered by cross-border data access requests.  
Non-compliance based on “apparent” lack of judicial validation 
The company might also decide not to execute an order when it is “apparent” that judicial 
scrutiny has not been ensured in the issuing Member State. This is the second hypothesis of 
non-compliance contemplated by the proposed regulation, which includes the right for the 
service provider to raise certain claims in the issuing Member State “if the Order has not been 
issued or validated by a judicial authority”.121 However, such a ground of refusal to comply can 
only be raised as far as it relates to orders entailing the production or preservation of content 
data.122 In such cases, the service providers would have the duty to a) verify whether a judge 
has been involved in the adoption of an order in the issuing country; b) assess whether the 
involvement of the judicial authority in question offers sufficient guarantees from a 
                                                     
117 See Article 9 of the proposed Regulation. The normal deadline is 10 days, while authorities may set a shorter 
deadline where justified. Moreover, in emergency cases, defined as a situation where there is an imminent threat 
to life or physical integrity of a person or to a critical infrastructure, the deadline is 6 hours. 
118 Article 5 of the proposed Regulation.  
119 Recital 46 of the proposed Regulation.  
120 See United Nations Human Rights Council (2011). 
121 Proposed regulation Explanatory Memorandum, p. 10. 
122 Judicial scrutiny is not necessary for other types of data. 
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fundamental rights and rule of law perspective; and c) decide whether (or not) to object to the 
execution of the order. 
Deliberating upon these issues is very challenging because each Member State provides for a 
specific method of judicial validation for access to data in the context of criminal proceedings. 
National legal provisions in this regard differ significantly, with a clear demarcation between 
adversarial and inquisitorial systems of criminal procedure. In addition, different rules and 
oversight systems also apply to the issuing of cross-border requests for access to data, 
depending on the constitutional and institutional framework established in the country 
concerned. It is unclear how a private company would determine not only who qualifies as an 
independent judge under national law, but also whether the national judiciaries of various 
Member States satisfy EU law requirements regarding judicial independence. 
Only independent judicial authorities possess the necessary institutional prerogatives and 
professional capacity to ensure an appropriate assessment of whether a legitimate ground 
subsists for refusing the execution of another Member State’s criminal law enforcement 
measure. As a consequence, it appears that the new role that the proposed regulation on the 
European Production and Preservation Orders assigns to service providers risks undermining 
the coherent application of the effective judicial protection principle enshrined in Article 19 of 
the EU Charter. This is highly problematic from an EU constitutional law point of view.  
Furthermore, the possibility that a company does not object to a request for data where it 
should do so might also undermine the very objective of the proposed measure. For instance, 
there is a risk of a service provider or its legal representative executing a Production Order 
without realising that the targeted data enjoys special protection. In such situations, the result 
may well be that the data transferred by a service provider to the prosecuting authorities will 
not be admitted as evidence before a criminal court.123  
In the hypotheses on non-compliance described above (i.e. service providers’ refusal based on 
fundamental rights concerns or lack of judicial scrutiny considerations), the order should be 
enforced by the authorities of the competent Member State where the service provider is 
established or represented. The “enforcement member state” is responsible for recognising 
the issuing authorities’ order, confirming its enforceability and enforcing it. The fact that the 
enforcement Member State could well be different from the state where the service is 
provided, or where the data are located, but, more importantly, where the individuals to whom 
the data relate are located, adds to the complexity of the procedure. 
The draft regulation requires the enforcing authority to recognise and enforce an EPOC or 
EPOC-PR unless it considers that one of the grounds for refusal applies. These grounds are 
substantially limited to cases where the enforcing authority ascertains the following: 
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 the lack of formal judicial authorisation and a substantial threshold (when the orders 
concern content and transactional data);124 
 the existence of immunities and privileges, the impossibility of the service providers to 
comply (force majeure), a concern about national security or the European ordre public, 
or manifest violations of fundamental rights that result solely from the information 
contained in the order;125 and  
 the outreach of the order beyond the scope of the regulation (when the order is issued 
outside the pre-trial or trail phase, or when it does not target service providers providing 
services within the Union).126 
It is concerning that no further margin of appreciation is left to this eventual ‘executing 
authority’ as to the assessment of the legality, necessity and proportionality of the orders. At 
the same time, it is questionable that the authority responsible for the ‘enforcement’ will 
decide to execute another EU country’s order even when such a measure has not been adopted 
in accordance with the law of the eventually enforcing Member State. 
The notwithstanding, the proposed regulation foresees that the competent authority of the 
enforcing Member State must enforce the order even if its own domestic law provides for a 
higher standard of protection than the law of the issuing Member State. For instance, a Dutch 
authority could be obliged to enforce a Production Order issued by a French authority 
prosecuting a criminal offence for which, in the Netherlands, a similar measure is not allowed 
(Böse, 2018, p. 39). Also, and contrary to what is provided for under the EIO Directive, there is 
no possibility for the eventually enforcing authority to implement the foreign investigative 
measure through less pervasive means.  
Non-compliance based on conflicts of obligations  
Companies would be allowed (and thus, presumably expected) to object to the execution of 
the orders when this is required to solve ‘conflicts of obligations’ between EU law and legal 
provisions from other jurisdictions (e.g. the US).127 This constitutes the third hypothesis of non-
compliance. These conflicts of obligations are typical of the ‘unmediated model’ for law 
enforcement access to data and arise when, sometimes in spite of the requesting country’s 
perception, the transfer of data triggers legal consequences or liabilities in the affected country 
for the requested private company. The purpose of the Commission’s proposal to compel 
service providers established outside the Union to appoint legal representatives in the EU is to 
turn the process of serving a Production Order into an ‘EU internal process’. However, these 
                                                     
124 Ibid., Article 14(2), (4)(a–b) and (5)(a). 
125 Ibid., Article 14(4)(f) and (5)(e). 
126 Ibid., Article 14(4)(e) and (5)(d). 
127 Articles 15 and 16 of the proposed Regulation provide for a review procedure if the service providers 
headquartered in third countries are faced with conflicting obligations. 
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service providers would remain subject to the legal obligations standing in the (non-EU) foreign 
legal system where they are established (e.g. the US). 
Under the proposed regulation the risks of a conflict of laws are likely to increase not only within 
the EU, but also when European Production or Preservation Orders are issued for data stored 
in the US and/or upon US companies. As already noted, the Fourth Amendment requires a 
warrant with probable cause to provide foreign authorities access to the content of electronic 
communications stored in the US. It is far from certain that in the absence of such a warrant, 
service providers will be able to provide EU Member State LEAs access to the requested data 
without incurring liabilities under US law. Similarly, US authorities’ requests for direct access to 
data held by private companies and falling under EU jurisdiction are likely to raise a conflict of 
law when disclosure of the requested data would result in a breach of EU primary or secondary 
law standards protecting fundamental rights, including the EU data protection acquis.  
The proposed regulation requires the addressee to inform the issuing authority of cases where 
compliance with the order would cause infringements of the law(s) of a third country. Based 
on the “reasoned objection”128 of the service provider, the issuing authority may choose 
whether to withdraw the order or to uphold it. 
In the latter option, the case would be transferred to the competent court of the issuing 
Member State. It would therefore be up to the authorities of the latter to decide not only if the 
law of the third country applies to the case and if a conflict of law actually exists, but also to 
assess the lawfulness of the foreign legislation protecting the data against access. In carrying 
out the assessment, the issuing Member State court would have to decide whether the law of 
a third country is intended to protect legitimate interests (e.g. fundamental rights, or national 
security) or instead to shield illegal activities from LEA requests to data access.  
The proposed regulation requires the issuing Member State’s court that “ascertain[s]” the 
existence of a conflict of jurisdiction to request the “central authorities” of the third country 
concerned to express their opinion over the conflicting obligations. Yet, it is not clear whom, in 
the foreign jurisdiction, would ultimately be responsible to address the conflict of laws (Meijers 
Committee, 2018). 
If a conflict of law is found to exist (e.g. in the eventuality that the data request by the EU 
authority is directed at a company subject to US jurisdiction), the authority seeking the data 
will have to go through the MLA process. In these cases, the time required to execute the 
investigative measure originally provided for in the order would be longer that the one typically 
required to request and obtain data across borders directly through existing MLA channels.  
 
                                                     
128 See in particular Articles 15(1), 16(1) and 2(1) of the proposed Regulation.  
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4.2.4. Effectiveness and accessibility of remedies under the European Production and 
Preservation Order proposals 
As seen above, the proposed regulation includes a set of provisions aimed at granting service 
providers and individuals the possibility to challenge Production and Preservation Orders. At 
the same time, the actual availability, accessibility and effectiveness of the different complaint 
mechanisms that the Commission’s proposal foresees vary significantly. 
As already noted, service providers are granted a (limited) possibility to contravene an EPOC or 
EPOC-PR served upon them. If deciding not to execute the order, the addressee has the right 
to be heard before the authorities of the enforcement countries (the first and second 
hypotheses of non-compliance) or by the authorities of the issuing country (the third 
hypothesis of non-compliance).  
Nevertheless, the right of a non-compliant service provider to obtain an effective judicial 
remedy against a sanction would be undermined by the limited possibility that the eventually 
involved authority would have to refuse the recognition and enforcement of the order. As 
noted above, the authorities eventually involved in the enforcement phase might decide not to 
enforce the order only in specifically circumscribed circumstances (force majeure, the European 
ordre public, manifest fundamental rights abuses, etc.). A negative assessment of the legality, 
necessity and proportionality of the issuing authority’s order is not included among the grounds 
that could be used to oppose its enforcement. 
Another point of concern relates to the prospect that individuals may lack clear indications as 
to exactly which country and authority to bring their claims that rights or procedural rules are 
violated in the issuing or execution of a European Production Order. Article 17 of the draft 
regulation provides that both the suspect of a crime concerned by a European Production Order 
and persons whose data were requested without them being suspect or accused in criminal 
proceedings could seek remedies in the country of the issuing authority. The suspect and 
accused person or third parties whose data have been transmitted would have the right to 
challenge the legality of the order according to the law of the issuing Member State.129 
At the same time, it is very likely that a situation will arise in which the individual involved – 
either being a suspect or not – resides in a Member State that is different from both the issuing 
Member State and the state on which territory the company’s legal representative or 
establishment is placed (Meijers Committee, 2018, p. 4). The risk is increasing uncertainty for 
affected individuals as to which country is responsible for assessing the complaint. This risk 
escalates in cases where service providers are requested by the issuing authorities to ensure 
the confidentiality of the EPOC or the EPOC-PR and of the data produced or preserved.130 
Challenges to adequately assess complaints by affected individuals would also arise in cases 
where the courts in the issuing state are in fact not the ‘best placed’ to satisfy the requirements 
                                                     
129 Article 17(1) and (3) of the proposed Regulation.  
130 Article 11(2) of the proposed Regulation. 
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of impartiality and independence necessary to ensure an effective and practical safeguarding 
of the right of access to justice. In view of that, it must be considered less obvious to only allow 
individuals to lodge their complaint in either the issuing Member State or the state in whose 
territory a company preserved or transmitted the requested data. Doubts exist as to the actual 
possibility for individuals to bring their complaints before an independent court in their state 
of residence. 
4.2.5. EU privacy and data protection safeguards 
The proposal for a regulation on European Production and Preservation Orders for electronic 
evidence in criminal matters also raises a number of important data protection issues. 
The two most significant issues regarding data protection concern, first, the very necessity of 
the measures foreseen by the proposal, and second, its systematic reliance on the idea that 
some categories of data might be processed subject to only a very limited set of legal 
requirements, on the basis of the alleged relatively limited impact on fundamental rights of 
their processing.  
The first question is linked to the justification for publishing the proposal. As detailed in the 
Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the text, the European Commission’s main argument 
in this respect is that the current situation is problematically fragmented and characterised by 
legal uncertainty; the existing landscape, indeed, would be the result of juxtaposing 
“mechanisms for cooperation between countries [that] were developed several decades 
ago”131 and a series of “national tools” developed since by some Member States and third 
countries.132 
The proposal, however, would not replace existing mechanisms and tools,133 but rather offer 
an additional possible path to access data. Although it might actually reduce legal certainty for 
companies potentially subject to conflicting obligations,134 it does not, as such, reduce legal 
uncertainty for individuals – on the contrary, it adds an extra layer of unpredictability. As a 
result of the proposal, it would become even more difficult than currently for individuals to be 
able to determine who has access to their personal data, and on which grounds (which are 
dependent on the jurisdiction of the issuing authority, possibly not their own). Today’s 
fragmented and complex135 reality would thus not be improved. Instead, the proposal could be 
interpreted as enabling data processing in an unforeseeable manner, which would be in direct 
tension with EU fundamental rights requirements. 
                                                     
131 See the proposed Regulation Explanatory Memorandum, p. 1. 
132 Idem; also echoed in recital 8 of the proposed Regulation. 
133 See for instance, “[t]his instrument will co-exist with the current judicial cooperation instruments that are still 
relevant and can be used as appropriate by the competent authorities” (ibid., p. 2); and “[t]he new instrument will 
not replace the EIO for obtaining electronic evidence but provides an additional tool for authorities” (ibid., p. 3). 
134 Illustrating the focus on service providers’ perspectives is recital 9 of the proposed Regulation. 
135 Ibid., p. 7. 
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A second critical issue refers to the idea according to which it is justified to attach (and, more 
critically, de-tach) different conditions to the processing of the various categories of data put 
forward in the proposal on the grounds of their “different levels of interference with 
fundamental rights”.136  
In this context, it must be noted that EU data protection law generally applies to any processing 
of personal data, exclusively because they are personal data in the sense of related to an 
identified or identifiable person. Although it is true that some special types of personal data 
(falling under the notion of ‘sensitive’ data) are granted special, additional protection, and that 
certain types of processing are regarded as involving a higher risk and thus subject to added, 
more stringent rules, this should not be interpreted as allowing the classification of some data 
as falling under certain categories in order to deprive them of basic data protection standards. 
In this sense, Article 8 of the EU Charter also applies to any processing of personal data, and 
not just personal data that could be ranked as having a high “level of interference” with 
fundamental rights. 
The ECtHR has explicitly set aside arguments according to which the acquisition of “related 
communications data” (encompassing different instances of “traffic data”) would necessarily 
be less intrusive than the acquisition of the communications’ content.137 The Court has in 
particular underlined that actually in some cases the processing of “related communications 
data” magnifies the degree of intrusion, “since the patterns that will emerge could be capable 
of painting an intimate picture of a person through the mapping of social networks, location 
tracking, Internet browsing tracking, mapping of communication patterns, and insight into who 
a person interacted with”. 
In the Benedik judgment, the ECtHR stressed that what could appear to be “peripheral 
information sought by the police, namely the name and address of a subscriber”, must in some 
situations “be treated as inextricably connected to the relevant pre-existing content revealing 
data”, as failing to do so would deny “the necessary protection to information which might 
reveal a good deal about the online activity of an individual, including sensitive details of his or 
her interests, beliefs and intimate lifestyle”.138 
The published proposal distinguishes two broad types of data: stored content data and ‘non-
content data’, the latter comprising subscriber, access and transactional data.139 It is not 
disputed that all these data can constitute, or at least comprise, personal data. According to 
the Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the proposal, personal data covered by it are 
“protected and may only be processed in accordance with the General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR) and the Data Protection Directive for Police and Criminal Justice Authorities 
                                                     
136 Ibid., p. 14. 
137 See the judgment in Big Brother Watch and Others, para. 356. 
138 Judgment in Benedik v. Slovenia, 24 April 2018 [ECLI:CE:ECHR:2018:0424JUD006235714], para. 109. On the 
necessity of a court order to grant access to such data, even if apparently peripheral: para. 129. 
139 Recital 20 of the proposed Regulation. 
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(Law Enforcement Data Protection Directive)”.140 Furthermore, a provision “recalls” that the 
regulation cannot alter fundamental rights obligations derived from Article 6 TEU.141 
The text presented by the European Commission, nevertheless, recurrently insists that some of 
the categories used imply different levels of interference with fundamental rights, without 
detailing exactly how different would they be, while at the same time cryptically maintaining 
that some levels would be coincidental, and for instance that the level of interference with 
fundamental rights of access data “is similar to that of subscriber data”.142 
Recital 23 of the draft regulation appears to attempt to account for the supposed different 
degrees of “interference with fundamental rights” of the described categories of data by 
referring to the different ‘usefulness’ of subscriber and access data, on the one hand, and 
transactional and content data, on the other, in relation to investigations and as probative 
material. Recognising that some types of data are most regularly sought or relied upon at 
different stages of investigations, however, does not as such alter the fact that any processing 
of personal data might be regarded as a limitation of the right to personal data protection, and 
must comply with all relevant standards. 
Bringing in even more haziness to the reasoning, recital 30 describes transactional and content 
data as having a “more sensitive character”, and subscriber and access data as being “less 
sensitive”, which would legitimise that the latter might be issued or validated by prosecutors 
without the involvement of a judicial authority.143 As mentioned, EU data protection law does 
provide special rules for certain categories of data (generally designated as “sensitive data”),144 
but otherwise its basic standards generally apply to all personal data, not providing for 
adjustments or modulations based on some perceived gradations of their minor “sensitive 
character”. 
In combination with the different treatment granted to the categories of data put forward, the 
proposal also resorts to a problematic distinction between European Production Orders and 
European Preservation Orders, according to which, as the latter do not by themselves “result 
in data disclosure”, they would not “give rise to similar concerns” as the former.145 This 
distinction appears to negate the fact that any processing of personal data can be regarded as 
a limitation of the right to personal data protection, including data collection, storage or 
conservation that would not result in access by another party. All relevant data protection 
requirements must thus be fulfilled, independent of any disclosure. 
                                                     
140 Ibid., p. 3. 
141 Ibid., p. 13. 
142 Recital 21 of the proposed Regulation. 
143 See also European Commission (2018c), p. 16. Following the same argumentation, recital 31 of the proposed 
regulation notes that this would also justify orders to produce subscriber data and access data being issued for 
any criminal offence. 
144 See, in this sense, Article 9 of the GDPR (also recital 10 of the GDPR). 
145 Ibid., p. 22. 
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On the basis of this further problematic distinction, nonetheless, the Explanatory 
Memorandum accompanying the proposal argues that its planned review procedure can be 
limited to the European Production Order, and that no specific remedies are needed for 
European Preservation Orders.146 In practice, this also means that the available remedies must 
be exercised always against the European Production Order (if any) and in the issuing state. 
In the same vein, the proposal addresses the restriction of the rights of data subjects whose 
data are sought by European Production Orders in Article 11. Such a provision foresees that 
when the individual is not informed by the service provider upon request of the issuing 
authority, “the issuing authority shall inform the person in accordance with Article 13 of the 
Law Enforcement Data Protection Directive once there is no longer a risk of jeopardising the 
investigation and include information about available legal remedies”.147 Yet there is no 
equivalent provision for European Preservation Orders, because presumably “the lesser 
interference with rights involved” would make that unnecessary.148 It is difficult to argue this 
could be compliant with Article 23 of the GDPR, which establishes the conditions for any 
legislative measure to restrict data subject rights.  
Additionally, there are a number of other important data protection issues, among which the 
following merit highlighting: 
 Insufficient safeguards against excessive data processing. The proposal does not consider in 
enough detail measures to prevent excessive data processing, which could be imposed on 
both the issuing authority and the service provider. Recital 57 notes that “Member States 
should ensure that appropriate data protection policies and measures apply to the 
transmission of personal data from relevant authorities to service providers for the 
purposes of this Regulation, including measures to ensure the security of the data” , and 
that “[s]ervice providers should ensure the same for the transmission of personal data to 
relevant authorities”, but not enough consideration is given to need to prevent the 
collection of unnecessary data, or filter them out before transmission.  
 Insufficient protection for the personal data of third persons (‘collateral intrusion’). The 
processing of data enabled by the proposal will potentially involve the processing of 
personal data of third persons (as is typically the case with data held by providers of 
electronic communications services, social networks, online marketplaces, other hosting 
service providers and providers of internet infrastructure). The proposal does not detail 
how such processing should be minimised, or the safeguards to be put in place. Recital 54 
states that “[i]t is essential that all persons whose data are requested in criminal 
investigations or proceedings have access to an effective legal remedy, in line with Article 
47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union”, but actually the rights of 
those whose data were not requested but are nevertheless processed should also be 
                                                     
146 Ibid. 
147 Ibid., p. 20. 
148 Ibid. 
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respected. Furthermore, it needs to be taken into account that collateral intrusion might 
affect the communications of persons enjoying special protection, as well as special 
categories of data. 
 Problematic side-lining of the Law Enforcement Data Protection Directive: Directive (EU) 
2016/680,149 commonly referred to the Law Enforcement Data Protection Directive, is the 
main EU legal instrument specifically conceived for the protection of personal data with 
regard to the processing of personal data for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, 
detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, 
including the safeguarding against and the prevention of threats to public security. It 
contains, therefore, special rules on issues which are absent from the GDPR such as 
distinguishing different categories of data subjects;150 the distinction between personal 
data based on facts from personal data based on personal assessments;151 or specially 
adapted modulations of the rights of data subjects. Said Directive applies however only 
when data are processed for such purposes by ‘competent authorities’, defined as either:152 
o any public authority competent for the prevention, investigation, detection or 
prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, including 
the safeguarding against and the prevention of threats to public security; or 
o any other body or entity entrusted by Member State law to exercise public 
authority and public powers for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, 
detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal 
penalties, including the safeguarding against and the prevention of threats to 
public security. 
Assuming the private companies impacted by the proposed e-evidence rules would not be 
covered by such definitions, the processing of personal data by them would fall under the 
GDPR. Although this instrument might be regarded in general terms as more protective than 
the Law Enforcement Data Protection Directive, it allows for restrictions of data subject rights 
which could eventually be activated without the necessary accompanying rules and 
modulations in line of the specific approach embodied by the Directive.  
                                                     
149 Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of 
natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the 
prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and 
on the free movement of such data, and repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA. 
150 See Article 6 of Directive (EU) 2016/680: ‘(a) persons with regard to whom there are serious grounds for 
believing that they have committed or are about to commit a criminal offence; (b) persons convicted of a criminal 
offence; (c) victims of a criminal offence or persons with regard to whom certain facts give rise to reasons for 
believing that he or she could be the victim of a criminal offence; and (d) other parties to a criminal offence, such 
as persons who might be called on to testify in investigations in connection with criminal offences or subsequent 
criminal proceedings, persons who can provide information on criminal offences, or contacts or associates of one 
of the persons referred to in points (a) and (b)’. 
151 Ibid., Article 7. 
152 Ibid., Art. 3(7). 
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These issues must be considered in addition to the fundamental requirement of conditioning 
the acquisition by a public authority of communications data from a communications services 
provider to prior review by a national court or independent administrative body. In this regard, 
the ECtHR has notably emphasised that the legal framework determining such a review must 
give sufficient indications to enable individuals to know the circumstances and conditions under 
which public authorities are permitted to request access to data.153 
As noted, in the Digital Rights Ireland judgment the CJEU stressed that compliance with EU 
fundamental rights and the principle of proportionality requires making access by competent 
national authorities to communications data dependent on a prior review carried out by a court 
or by an independent administrative body, to intervene following a reasoned request of those 
authorities submitted within the framework of procedures of prevention, detection or criminal 
prosecutions.154 From this statement, it is not possible to infer that such compliance with EU 
fundamental rights and the principle of proportionality would actually be obtained by a legal 
instrument making possible access to data to authorities of (potentially) any country, even if 
dependent on a prior review carried out by a court or administrative body of such a Member 
State or third country, within the framework of procedures of their own legal frameworks. Such 
a possibility would directly affect, indeed, the requirement of foreseeability to be respected by 
all interreferences with the rights enshrined in Article 8 of the ECHR.    
5. Concluding remarks 
Considerable pressure is mounting within the Union and at the international level to smooth 
law enforcement access to data across borders, as confirmed by new EU and US legislative 
initiatives directed at enabling the direct acceptance by private companies of data requests 
emanating from beyond the borders of the country where the service providers are based. 
The analysis conducted in this Report has shown that any law enforcement tools for the 
collection of data across borders can only smooth useful data flows, and contribute to the 
effective investigation and prosecution of crime, to the extent that they pass the EU legality 
test. The CJEU’s rejection of different controversial data-driven security measures confirms the 
importance of conducting a thorough assessment of EU (internal and external) actions’ 
compliance with EU fundamental rights and rule of law standards, and of conducting such an 
assessment on time (González Fuster 2017, pp. 87-92). The scrutiny of the US CLOUD Act and 
of the EU proposals on e-evidence in criminal matters raises several concerns as to their 
compatibility with such standards. 
Both instruments fall short of ensuring the dual oversight role that, under the EIO Directive and 
the MLAT system is assigned, first, to the authority of the issuing country and, second, to the 
authority of the executing country. The strength of this model of judicial cooperation results 
                                                     
153 See the Judgment of the Court (Fifth Section) of 8 February 2018, Case of Ben Faiza v France 
[ECLI:CE:ECHR:2018:0208JUD003144612], para. 75. 
154 Digital Rights Ireland, para. 62.  
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from the interactions between authorities of the issuing and executing country, and their 
complementary roles played in overseeing the legality, necessity and proportionality of a cross-
border request for data. 
Under EU law, the competent judicial authorities of the country where the order should be 
executed have the duty not to execute the cross-border investigative measure when a refusal 
is justified by considerations related to inter alia fundamental rights concerns and/or the 
incompatibility of the order with the criminal justice standards provided by EU and domestic 
law. These standards apply to requests emanating from Member States’ prosecuting 
authorities, which, acting under the scope of EU law, seek to access data across borders (both 
within and outside the EU). They must also be respected by foreign authorities requesting 
electronic information (pertaining to EU citizens or not), or held by private companies under 
EU law. Furthermore, they are binding upon the service providers holding the data sought.  
The direct involvement and responsibilities of service providers in the assessments of law 
enforcement requests for data is problematic and deserves utmost attention. Private 
companies holding the data sought might, as a matter of fact, be the best placed to conduct 
certain technical assessments related, for instance, to whether an IP address for which content 
data are requested is static (i.e. pertains to a single user) or dynamic (i.e. constantly and rapidly 
reassigned to new users). However, this cannot pre-empt nor replace the involvement of 
independent judicial actors, nor substitute for their scrutiny over a cross-border request for 
access to data. As the Court of Luxembourg eloquently stressed, the very existence of effective 
judicial review, designed to ensure compliance with EU law, is “the essence of the rule of law”.  
Independent judicial oversight is also required to ensure that the legitimate interest of service 
providers in complying with a foreign authority’s order to transfer data sought in the framework 
of a criminal investigation does not override the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms 
of the data subject. Service providers are surely responsible for maintaining a relation of trust 
and confidence with their clients, but monitoring respect of the conditions underpinning the 
principle of mutual trust in the EU criminal justice system is a radically different task. Only 
independent judicial authorities possess the necessary institutional prerogatives and 
professional capacity to ensure an appropriate assessment of whether a legitimate ground 
subsists for refusing the execution of another Member State or a third country’s criminal law 
enforcement measure. 
However, both the Commission’s proposal on e-evidence and the CLOUD Act fail to ensure 
systematic judicial scrutiny over cross-border request for data. In the absence of a systematic 
independent judicial validation in the issuing phase or executing phase of a cross-border 
request for data, it will become difficult to ensure that the requested information is restricted 
to what is relevant and necessary for the prosecution of a crime.  
The possibility that a company does not object to a request for data when it should do so might 
undermine the very objective of the measures in questions, which reportedly is to effectively 
enforce criminal justice through evidence-gathering across borders. Increase in conflicts of law, 
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and the chances of exploitation and the overuse or disproportionate issuing of orders 
constitute key risks that could derive from the implementation of the direct cooperation model 
proposed under the EU e-evidence package and the CLOUD Act. In such situations, the result 
may well be that the data transferred by a service provider to the prosecuting authorities will 
not be admitted as evidence before a criminal court.  
The introduction of these new instruments could mean increasing the administrative burden in 
national judicial systems, with judges in the issuing countries being potentially required to 
review large numbers of orders, or to address complex jurisdictional issues. Pragmatically, the 
measures might actually trigger significant operational difficulties, and thus not solve or 
contribute to solving problems such as a lengthy wait to access certain data.  
Another risk is that the measures could authorise practices that will have an unlawful impact 
on the rights to respect of private life and to the protection of personal data. The Commission 
proposal on the establishment of European Production and Preservation Orders, in particular, 
inappropriately distinguishes between different types of personal information. The lawfulness 
of the choice to automatically grant lower levels of privacy and data protection to subscriber 
and access data is doubtful, as based on the unverified assumption that these categories of 
information are less-sensitive by default. 
The actual content of the e-evidence proposals might change as the measures tabled by the 
Commission undergo further inter-institutional negotiations. Despite the shortcomings 
highlighted in this report, the possibility also exists that further critical elements are introduced. 
With regard to the proposed Regulation, it is concerning to note from ongoing discussions 
within the Council that the EU co-legislator is considering the option of dispensing law 
enforcement actors from the requirement to obtain a judicial validation of data requests in a 
wider range of situations, including the mere existence of cybersecurity threats or a claim that 
obtaining validation in time would not be possible.155 Similarly, and with significant data 
protection implications, it must be highlighted the risk that would derive from changes in the 
Commission proposal which would be directed at allowing for the further processing of data, 
for example in criminal proceedings unrelated to the original data request, or even for other 




                                                     
155 Council 2018a, p.  10 and 22. 
156 Ibid. p .30.  






Judicial authorities who are independent from the executive branch and who 
exercise judicial oversight functions in the pre-trial phase, as well as 
independent judicial actors responsible for admitting and/or evaluating evidence 




Judicial or administrative authorities with the competence to order the gathering 
of information as part of a criminal investigation, and who are responsible for 
coordinating criminal investigations and/or representing the prosecution in 
a criminal trial. 
Law enforcement 
authorities (LEAs) 
Governmental police authorities involved in criminal investigations; depending on 
the specific national framework of reference, this category might also include 
specialised law enforcement agencies (customs, anti-fraud, etc.). LEAs do not 
include intelligence or security services. 
Central authorities Representatives of the executive branch dealing with the issuing of cross-border 
requests and/or responsible for the processing (e.g. transmission or translation) 
of incoming foreign requests for access to data for criminal proceedings. This 
category includes liaison magistrates/prosecutors who are seconded abroad (e.g. 
to the foreign ministry by the justice ministry) and responsible for facilitating and 
advising on matters concerning mutual legal assistance in relation to the 
investigation and prosecution of transnational and cross-border crime. 
 
Service providers 
   Providers of services in the EU market and/or with a significant presence in the 
EU, whether or not they have their site in the EU. The providers of the following 
services are covered: 
 Telecommunication services (voice telephony, SMS and internet access 
services); 
 Internet-based services enabling interpersonal communications such as 
voice-over-IP, instant messaging and web-based email services;157 these 
also include over-the-top (OTT) communication service providers;158  
 Information society services that store data for remuneration, at a 
distance, by electronic means and at the individual request of a recipient 
of services;159 these include social networks (e.g. Facebook and Twitter), 
cloud services (e.g. Microsoft, Dropbox and Amazon Web Services), online 
market places (e.g. eBay and Amazon) or hosting services providers (e.g. 
Bluehost); and 
                                                     
157 See the proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the European 
Electronic Communication Code (Recast) (European Commission, 2016). 
158 They are not currently covered by the EU electronic communications framework established under Directive 
2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory framework 
for electronic communications networks and services (Framework Directive). This might change under the new EU 
electronic communication and e-Privacy framework.  
159 Ibid. 
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 Internet infrastructure services, such as IP address service providers and 
domain registrars, and associated privacy and proxy services (e.g. 
GoDaddy). 
Small and medium enterprises also fall under the scope of the proposal. 
Legal 
representative 
A natural or legal person to be designated by a service provider established in the 
EU or providing services in the EU market. Service providers would be free to 
appoint one or more legal representatives in the EU. The representative is 
intended to act as an intermediary (‘procedural tool’) to facilitate direct 
cooperation and enforcement. The representative would be able and authorised 
by the service providers to receive, process and comply with production and/or 
preservation orders. It is through the representative that legal obligations under 
the proposal could be enforced by means of administrative sanctions. The legal 
representative does not need to have control or access to requested data. Service 
providers might decide to cumulate separate functions in one and the same 
person. For instance, the legal representative appointed to receive Production and 
Preservation Order Certificates could be the same person to act as a legal 
representative under Article 27 of the GDPR and the e-Privacy representative. 
 
Electronic information 
Content data The content exchanged by means of electronic communications services, such as 
text, voice, images and sound.160 While content data include both stored and 
intercept (i.e. data from real-time interception of telecommunications) electronic 
communications content, the Commission has stressed that intercept data are 
out of the scope of the proposal. However, discussions within the Council suggest 
that the scope of the proposed regulation could be expanded to also cover this 
type of data (live interception).161  
Non-content data Metadata Data processed in an electronic communications network for 
the purpose of transmitting, distributing or exchanging 
electronic communications content. Metadata encompasses 
data used to trace and identify the source and destination of a 
communication; data on the location of the device generated 
in the context of providing electronic communications services; 
and the date, time, duration and type of communication.162 
Metadata also includes, for instance, data relative to the 
connection, traffic or location of the communication.163 
                                                     
160 Article 4(3)(b) of the proposal for a Regulation concerning the respect for private life and the protection of 
personal data in electronic communications and repealing Directive 2002/58/EC (Regulation on Privacy and 
Electronic Communications) (European Commission, 2017c). 
161 See Council of the European Union (2018b), p. 3. 
162 Ibid., Article 4(3)(c). 
163 See European Commission (2018a), p. 43. 
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Subscriber data Information that allows the identification of a subscriber to a 
service. Examples are the subscriber’s name, address and 
telephone number.164 
Access logs Information that records the time and date an individual  




Information that identifies products or services an individual 
has obtained from a provider or a third party (e.g. a purchase 
of cloud storage space).166 
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